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Draft Resolution
on parliamentary cooperation in central Europe
The Assembly,
(t) Stressrng the rmportance for securrt)' and stabilrtl' Europe-u'rde of decisrons to be takcn b1'
NATO and the European Uruon rvrth a vierv to their enlargement to rnclude the countnes of central
Europe.
(rt) Notrng thc central European states' endeavours and correspondrng progress in the economic,
polrtrcal and defence spheres and in consolidating parhamentary democracv urth a vierv to their
accession to the Atlantrc and European instrtutions under the best possrble condrtrons.
(iu) Hopeful that the enlargement processes can be gradually extended to all central and eastern
European countries so as to avord creating new geopolitrcal divrsrons across the contment;
(O Convmcedthat interparhamentarl'cooperation can contribute to the success of this process and
towards alleviating the politrcal uncertaintres likely to becomc apparent in states that are not to bc
admitted to NATO and the European Uruon m the near future:
(r) Stressing the need to ensure that NATO and European Union enlargement do not markcdlv
affect the efficiency or u'orking methods of those organrsations and that their respective achrevements
are preserved;
(w) Pointing to the positive contributron regronal cooperatlon instrtutions make to Europe's stabrlrtv
and the development of the countnes involved, and hopeful that the accession of some of thcir members
to NATO and the Europcan Union will not call such cooperatlon rnto question.
(wr) Noting urth concern that there has been no serious drscussron to date of the issues raised by
enlargement rn thc parhaments of the member, associate member. associate partner and observer
countries, even though governments are on the point of taking therr decrsron;
(wtt) Recalhng Order 90 rn which the Assembly states that "more rntensrve cooperation betrveen the
WEU Assembll- and the central European parliaments constrtutes an rmportant element in the process of
integratton of these countries in the structures of European polrtrcal and defence cooperation",
TNVITES THE PARLIAMENTS OF MEMBER, ASSOCIATE MEMBER, ASSOCIATE
PARTNER AND OBSERVER COLTNTzuES
I To intensifr bilateral and multilatcral interparhamentary cooperatron in the run-up to the debates
on ratification of future agreements on NATO and European Union enlargement;
2. To encourage permanent exchangcs bctu'een therr forergn affarrs, defence and, as approprrate.
European af[arrs committees on mattcrs rclatrng to the process of accession to the transatlantrc and
European institutrons, having regard to the gradual nature ofthat process,
3. To enhance cooperation on such matters rvrth the WEU Assembly rvhich by vrrtue of the modrfied
Brussels Treaty remains thc solc European Assembly' u,rth responsibility for European securih' and
defence
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Draft Decision
on parliamentary cooperotion in central Europe
The Assembll,,
fi) Notrng rvrth sattsfactton that, generally speakrng, the avarlabilitv of mformatron on WEU has
tmproved. largell' as a result of rmtiatives taken by thc Assembll'. the ministerial organs and member
states. uhrch have led to pubhcation and distribution of documcnts about the Organisation and rts r,vork,
usmg ln partrcular the communrcatrons potentral of the Intcrnet.
ftr) Stressing the rmportance of the read.v- avarlabrlrtl'of such rnformatlon ln the central and eastern
European countrics. some of u'hich are prepanng to lorn NATO and the European Union, and
expressmg support for rnitratives that mrght encourage WEU rnformation centres berng opened rn those
countrrcs. as rs already'the case m Romarua and the Baltic states.
(rtt) Stressrng thc need to mform parhaments and the pubhc at large in WEU membcr, assoctate
member, associate partner and observer countries, and rn all countrres rvith u'hich thc Organisatron has
polrtrcal ties, about the Assembll"s role, responsibilities and activities,
DECIDES
To pubhsh an informatron sheet. u'rth regular updatcs, about the WEU Assemblv and its rvork,
intended for drstrrbutton to parhaments and the urder public, as necessar)'by'means of the Internet
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Exp lanatory Memorandu m
(submitted by Mr Jacquat, Rapporteur)
I. Introduction
I On 25 June 1996 Slovenia became WEU's
tenth associate partncr country' 
- 
an event of lim-
rted polrtrcal scopc but one rvhich rllustrates the
central Europcan countries' perception of
WEU's role as a contact point 
- 
a brrdge even 
-
s'rth the European Union and NATO. Their
involvement rn WEU's actrvitres, under the
arrangemcnts broadlv defined in the Krrchberg
Declaratron of 9 May' 1994, is helprng them drau'
closer to the real centres of European and
transatlantic economrc, political and defence
cooperatron Thrs rapprochcment, which has
been slow' but steadl, to date, is supposed to
speed up srgnrficantll' from the second half of
thrs 1'car and into the earll' part of the next
century
2. Thc catchxord of the rvhole process rs
"enlargement". as apphed first to NATO, then
the European Unron and ultimatelv to WEU in
the case of countries that belong to the first two
organrsations It is a hrstonc event, thc rmplica-
tions of rvhrch are not 1'et obvrous but rvhich. if
successful, should usher m the beginnrng of the
end of the drvrsrons in Europe that have been the
cause of at least three conflicts on a rvorld scalc
- 
rncluding thc cold u'ar It rs rn thrs hght that
the ments of enlargement should be judged.
rather than focusmg on applicants and timetables
(the "u'ho and u'hcn") or technicalities. For thc
process to succeed means first and foremost that
rt should bc transparent, and that a real dialoguc
must bc rnitrated with all thc countries concerned
- 
partrcularly those that by reason of therr geo-
polrtrcal situation or economic and polrtrcal dcv-
elopment are to remain. for the trme bemg,
outsrde the organrsatlons rn question, but wrthout
becommg ahenated from them
3 At the same time. rt should not be forgot-
ten that there are costs involved 
- 
polrtrcal. eco-
nomrc. socral, cultural even 
- 
for ncu' entrants
and existrng members ahke Periods of adjust-
mcnt rvill be necessan' and conflrcts of interests
are bound to anse, as rn anv human cndeavour.
There is no runnrng au,a1- from the fact that thc
hrstory of thc European and transatlantic organ-
isatrons is replete rvith examples of stnfe, at
trmes outright polrtrcal conflrct. to the point cven
in one or trvo 
- 
fortunateh' rare 
- 
cases of
military sabre-rattling The arrival of the central
European countries, with therr complex hrstory
and therr determinatron nonetheless to occupv
u'hat they' regard as therr rightful placc alongside
therr "westsrn'' European counterparts must
therefore be handled rvith a great deal of dip-
lomacy and a kcen regard for compromise and
equity', if annoyance and misundcrstanding are to
be avoided betrveen full membcrs and applicants
for full membcrship and among the latter.
4. The last is a most lmportant point, espe-
cially' uith rcgard to the European Union. since
the accession of nerv members rs due to take
place at the very trme lvhcn a major qualttattve
shrft rs about to occur in thc contemporarl' hts-
tory of our continent 
- 
namelv the rntroductton of
monctan' union rvithrn an rrutral group of states 
-
whrch rn the longcr term rvill mevttablv have
malor politrcal conscquences for thrs rnncr core
and thereafter for all those rvrth n'hom thcy' have
tics rvrthrn the Unron The adoption of thc single
currencv b1' the nerv members in thc medium
term, rather than membership of the European
mstrtutions, Councrl, Commisston or Parltament.
rvrll be the event that trulv srgnrfies the end of
hrstorical and political divisions on thc continent
It rvill be possrble then to ludge whether m
Europe's case enlargement is sl'nonr,mous rvtth
prospentr,. stabilitl' and secuntv
5. Paradoxrcally, as far as defence is con-
cerned, cnlargcment now seems to be a foregone
conclusion even though lt ll'rll have a drrect
impact on one of the last-surviving slmbols of
state soverergntv. It is unquestionabll,a polrtrcal
decrsron driven more or less explicrtll' by the
Unrted States. Openrng NATO up to the states
of central Europe is thc cssenttal corollan to the
inrtiatrves taken b1'the Alliance m the frameu'ork
of the Partnershrp for Peace prograrnme, in
cooperation u'ith most countries of the continent.
The outstandrng rssues in this case are no longer
who are to bc thc first to 
.1orn and under rvhat
arrangements, but lvhat thc polrtrcal knock-on
effect of their entry rvrll be on rclatrons u'rth third
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countries (such as the Russran Federation) and
the other European institutions, given that some
states would prefer NATO enlargement to be
hnked with that of the European Unron and
WEU
6. Horvever for the time being, matters have
not progressed beyond the stage of diplomatic
overtures, with the real decisions to be taken
after the intergovernmental conference completes
its rvork on the revisron of the Maastricht Treaty
in June, and at the Atlantrc Alhance summrt due
to take place in Madrid m Julr,. Whatever their
outcome, natronal parhaments will have to rati$'
the results and, rn view of therr implications in
institutional, polrtical, economic and defence
terms, this wrll grve the elected assembhes of
central and eastern Europe an almost unique
opportunrtl' to brrng their influence directly to
bear on the enlargement process and conse-
quently upon the geopolitrcal structure of
Europe. The democratic deficrt to rvhrch fre-
quent reference was made during the debate on
the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, can be
elimrnated if parhaments are prepared to be
polrtrcalll, adventurous and seriously take on
board therr responsibilities as the representatlves
of the natrons that make up the contlnent
7. For the democracres of central Europe
which are to accede to the European Uruon and
NATO, thrs wrll also be an opportunity to test
the strength of the instrtutional hnks they have
forged with one another rn recent vears and to
look ahead to future polrtrcal and parhamentary
cooperation rvith one another rn full knowledge of
the fact that there rvrll be several timetables for
admission. Mamtammg dialogue and consulta-
tron rvill make a significant contribution to over-
coming the unccrtainties that might arise as
regards the varying positions rn which drfferent
countries find themselves and represents a factor
for polrtrcal stabrlrty necessar)' to the overall
success ofthe process for enlargrng the European
and transatlantic organisatrons.
II. The evolution of central Europe
8. The realitl' encompassed by the term
"central Europe" is diverse and complex 
- 
being
one u'here drfferences abound and the emphasis
is on indivrdualrty, rather than one where an1'
convergence between political and economic
choices is apparent. As far as "western Europe"
is concerned the term rs basically a semantic
simphficatron used to desrgnate the countries
u,hich belonged in one wa)' or another to rvhat
was once known as the "socralist bloc". During
the cold war period thc expressron "East Europe"
was more readily'used, although it now has little
currencv except, perhaps, in reference to the
Russran Federation Hou'ever, strictly speaking,
in geographical terms, Austna and Germany are
as much a part of central Europe as are Hungary
and Poland
9. As to the degree of polrtical and economrc
development the various countries have attained,
three distinct categories can be drstrnguished
among therr overall number. the first comprises
the states that are imminently to join NATO and
the European Unron, the second, for the time
being rather rll-defined, consrsts of countries not
rncluded in the first wave, and the third of areas
of the continent 
- 
from the Balkans to the Cauca-
sus 
- 
which are strll unstable. The first two
groups include all the WEU assocrate partners
which are the focus of the present report. The
central European countries cannot be categorised
rvith any' degree of exactitude since within each
group referred to there are developments taking
place, one of the maln purposes of rvhich rs to
bring about accesslon to, or closer alignment
wrth, the European and transatlantic institutions.
10. These countnes cooperate with one an-
other to differing extents in a number of fields,
but there is no disguising the fact that despite all
the efforts that have been made since the late
1980s, it has not been possible to establish a
genume economlc and political r,r'orkrng structure
such as exlsts ln the western half of the continent.
While it rs true that a rvide variety of operating
framervorks have been created 
- 
ranging from the
Central European Initiative to the Vrsegrad
Group or Black Sea Economic Cooperatron 
-
such hmited initiatives mvolve only small num-
bers of countries and are regarded by some or all
of therr members merely as intermediary stages
m therr progress towards accession to the Euro-
pean Union and NATO. Contacts such as these
are necessary moreover for the early settlement
of drfferences rvhrch, rf allorved to persist, could
be detrimental to the ultimate goal, but they can-
not in anv way' be said to represent any real pol-
icv coordrnation among the states concerned lrrth
a view to membership of the organrsations rn
question.
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1. Redrawing central Europe
11. The changes slnce the earll' 1990s,
whether of a political, social or economic nature,
can aptll' be described as "revolutionary" even
though this may at first srght seem to be a con-
tradictron rn terms. The first thrng that needs to
be grasped is that there rs no questron of a return
to an earlier way of hfe, deflected from rts origr-
nal course by the imposition of communism, but
of building new societies, in everv scnse of the
word, rvithin the region. Democracy and the
market econom)' are complex realrtres rn today's
world, as individual as the states where they are
practised, belying the srmphstrc notron that there
is one unique pattern which srmply has to be rep-
Iicated for success to be guaranteed. Thrs rs
something the central European countries quickly
came to realise, rvhen they first embarked on
economic reform, and later in the politrcal and
institutional spheres.
(a) A diversiJied economic area
12 The way in rvhich the economrc reforms
rvere carried out and therr progress rn recent
years serve to illustrate the complexitl'that char-
acterises the region It is drffrcult to avoid the
conclusion that such convergence or cooperation
as seem to have becn established have not given
nse to date to a central European economic area
in any state or form Differing levels of devel-
opment are admittedly also observable wrthin the
European Union, as is plain from the debate on
the single currency, but its member states are all
bound b1' a body of legislation the purpose of
which is to regulate trade between them and u,ith
third countries. In central Europe there is little
regional cooperation over NATO and European
Uruon accesslon. Each countr)' rs pursurng its
o\^rr course rn an effort to join the European
organrsatrons as qurckly as possible and not be
held back by' neighbours whose economic per-
formance is not up to the mark
13. Although the economic indicators are fav-
ourable on the whole, the prcture rs strll one of
rnstabrlity' and sharply contrastmg conditrons
both betw'een countrres of the region and within
them. Thrs makes any' overall approach to eco-
nomic issues diffrcult even though some comrnon
trends can be detected. Even so, four distinct
areas of development can be drstrngurshed:
states where economic reform is far
advanced, u'ith standards close to those
common to European Union members.
Romania and Bulgaria, where eco-
nomrc progress has been held back to
an extent but u'hich have recently put
on a spurt and are now corrrmltted to
fairly ambitrous reforms ;
the former sovret repubhcs, rvrth the
Russian Fcderation and Ukrarne berng
somethmg of a special case;
the Balkan states, whose economic
difficulties are also the result of the
wars and conflicts of recent years and
the rnternal political instabilitl, some of
them are experiencing.
14. All the WEU associate partners fall into
one or othcr of the first trvo groups and most
have signed Europe agreements glvmg them pref-
erential status in their relationshrps rvith thc
European Union. Of these the Czech Republic,
Estonra, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia
are the most advanced But they are not yet
entirely stable and are still dependent in large
measure on the aid and assistance provrded b1'
European and internatronal financial rnstitutions.
the World Bank, the IMF, the EBRD and the
European Union. Nevertheless they have suc-
ceeded in making the most of therr strengths in
terms of human and other resources, in order to
attain the level of development that characterises
the western part of the contincnt as quickly as
possible and for some of them accession to the
European Uruon wrthin the next five or slx years
rs startrng to look hke a feasible prospect. Bul-
garia has polrtical rnstabrlrty to contend with and
this has held up the reform of its econom1,, but an
end to the power struggle should make it possible
to take the decrsions the IMF and other financial
institutions recommend for its recovery. Rom-
ania, rvhrch is rn better shape 
- 
in political terms
too 
- 
can reasonabll' anticipate success tn re-
burldrng its economy so as to be able to accede to
the European Union in the medrum term
15 The new European states that emerged
from the break-up of the USSR are still at a dif-
ficult stage in the reform of therr economies.
Because of therr sze and the human and natural
resources they' possess, the Russran Federation
and Ukrame are of paramount lmportance, as
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therr mternal economrc development has political
rmplications for thc stabilrtl' of the entrre Euro-
pean continent Productron remarns lou' m thrs
particular comer of Europe, mflatron rs higher
than in the other central European countries and,
as a result of unemplolment and the fall in real
lncomes, poverty rs the lot of a large part of the
populationl Intemal polrtical instabilitl' also acts
as a brakc on the introduction of the reforms nec-
essar), to stimulate economrc grouth. u'ithout
rvhrch livrng standards cannot nse. Ard from
European and rnternational financial instrtutrons
here takes on political signrficance, not on11,' as a
rvay' of contrrbuting to economrc stabrlrtl' but
also as a means of avoidrng maJor soclal cnscs
that mrght have polrtical repercussrons. at home
and abroad.
16 After more than five 1'ears of interstate and
crvrl war, Bosnra and Herzegovina, Croatra, the
Former Yugoslav Repubhc of Macedonra and the
Fcdcral Repubhc of Yugoslavra (Serbra and
Montenegro) are experiencing drfficulties that
stcm from disruptron caused to therr economies
by' the conflict and the mtemational and unrlat-
eral embargoes. Reconstruction in each of these
states urll be possible only rvrth outsrde assrs-
tancc adequate to meet the challenges tho' face
and whose aims are conslstent. Croatra and
Serbia have the economlc potentral to overcome
therr drfficultres, provrdcd thc rnternal polrtrcal
situation improves, but Bosnia and Herzegovma.
sublect to de facto division rnto three polrtrcal
entrtres (Muslim, Croat and Scrb), rs strll u'artrng
for the economic ard promised by' European and
mternatronal organrsatrons, rvrthout u'hrch recov-
en' is impossible rn the short term, a factor which
could threaten the entrre peace process begun at
Dalton.
17 The Former Yugoslav Repubhc of Mace-
donra n'hose ternton' has escaped the ravages of
the Yugoslav conflict, has been badll'affected by
the fall-out from the mternational cmbargo
agamst the belhgerents and the urulateral
embargo rmposed by' Greece. Nevertheless the
improvement in its relatrons rrrth rts Greek
neighbour, and the hftrng of the embargo. give
grounds for hope for an rmprovement in its eco-
nomic situatron. As to Albania. the absence of
I World Bank. 1996 Annual Report,
Europe and ccntral Asra. page I I I
effectrve reform has grven nse to opcn insurrec-
tron agalnst the ccntral government and the
rcsulting rnstabrlrtv uill further delay' the coun-
try's economic recoverl' It u'ould seem that
Albanra should be a pnma faue case for specral
help from the internatronal financial rnstitutions
and thc European Union in order to prevent the
countn, from drsmtegratrng completelv. urth ser-
lous consequences for rts neighbours u'hrch are
home to large ethnrc Albanian conmunltles or
take in substantial numbers of Albanian refugces
and rmmrgrants
(b) The complex problem of establishing a
community of interests
18. Economrc diversitr'. rvhich also drives
regronal competltlon. is one factor rvhich has
rnhrbrted the formation of a central European
entrt)' to take over from the old cold rvar struc-
tures. The latter were lmposed b1' a dommant
power and were naturallv enough relectcd upon
the demrse of rvhat \4'as once known as thc Soviet
bloc. most of u'hose erstrvhile members are now
lookrng tou'ards thc European Uruon. Vanous
forms of regional cooperation have admrttedly'
been estabhshed, includmg free trade areas, but
rndivrdual states have reverted to therr natronal
traditions, uhrch sen'es m part to explain the
diffenng approaches that can be observed to the
economlc reforms advocatcd by' the internatronal
financral rnstrtutions and the European Union
This has rnevrtably led to variatlons rn develop-
mcnt. u'rth somc countries managing to stabilise
their economrcs more quickly' and align them-
selves more closclv u'rth Europcan standards,
u'hrle others are cxperiencing diffrculties rvith the
transltlon
19. It is clear. rn thrs case, that the more dev-
elopcd natrons havc no rvish to tie themselves
dor,rn to regional commitments uhrch u'ould
delal' therr assrmrlatron rnto the European mstr-
tutions Hos'ever thrs does not mean that ties
formed rn recent years need bc abandoned and rt
is accepted rn princrple that rf one countn' or
anothcr rvcre to 1oin, it u'ould have a tonic effect
on its close nerghbours and on the region as a
rvhole. provrded that those states that remain
outsrde the process can look foruard to the pros-
pect of mtcgratron in the medrum term Other-
mse the effect might be to entrench lasting eco-
nomlc drvrsrons on the continent. u'rth overtones
Chapter IV,
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of the North-South divide and damagrng conse-
quences for central Europe's stabrlrtv
20. As the deadhnes set for NATO and poss-
iblv European Union enlargement approach. this
process is becoming more marked, with all the
potentral candidates seekrng to drsplay them-
selves to advantage in ordcr to be the first to 1oin,
rcgardless of regronal solidaritl'. Such an attrtude
is understandable from countnes that are also
trying to shake off feehngs of havrng been iso-
lated from and depnved of the benefits of West-
crn European economlc and instrtutional devel-
opment for so manv )'ears, and rvhich are appre-
hensive, in manv cases wrth good reason, of con-
tinuing to be held at arm's length The percep-
tron of enlargcment as subject to possibll, lengthy'
negotiation procedures and the fear of missing
the opportunrtl' on offer is spurring them on at
speeds that vary but u'ithout 
- 
a fact rvorth not-
ing 
- 
creatmg a spirit of competrtron betrveen the
applicant states that could give nse to polrtical
tensrons.
21. The economrc drmension thus provides an
rllustration of the sheer complexitv that charac-
terises central Europe, u'hose onlv common
ground is the cold-rvar penod. Furthcr factors 
-
cultural and religrous drversitv and the region's
chequered history- 
- 
lie at the root of cnsrs srtua-
trons that at times have dramatrc consequences.
Although there has been substantral progress in
interstate negotiations over settlmg border dis-
putes or differcnces over mrnorrtres m the central
part of the region 
- 
for example. the recent
agreements bctu'een Hungary and Romania or
Romarua and Ukrame (still being negotiated) or,
in a drfferent regrster, betu'een Germany' and the
Czech Repubhc 
- 
tensrons strll persist to the
extrcme north and south. for mstance betu'een
Estonia and the Russran Federatron (over defin-
ing common borders) or across the Balkans from
Albania to Bulgaria.
22. A further factor in addition to those men-
tioncd above, the degree of rvhose impact 
- 
posl-
trve or negatrve 
- 
cannot easily be evaluated, is
the support a givcn country claims to have from
one or more European Union states, and, con-
versely', horv far a persistent disagrccment vvith
one of its member states may preludrce relation-
shrps with the Union. The search for external
sponsorship thus leads to divrsions that make the
efficrent operation of the feu' instrtutions for
regional cooperatron s'hich have been established
m recent years 
- 
the Central European Initiatrve
(of rvhich Yugoslavia \\'as a founder member) or
the Baltrc Councrl 
- 
somcu'hat problematrc in the
sense that an),' rapprochement wrth a ma1or
European Uruon member rs percerved as an ad-
vantagc rn future accesslon negotratrons and may
lead to a weakening of cooperatron rvlth partners
and nerghbours that are less u'ell placed eco-
nomicallv and politically.
23. Horvever in general terms, one can but
applaud the efforts of recent vears rn the eco-
nomic sphere, In sprte of changes of govemment,
the social problems attendant on anv economic
reform, the occasronal scandals marrmg the prr-
vatrsation proccss, pyramid investment srvindles
and the rest, thcse countries have managed to
hold to a steady course in openrng up their eco-
nomies, adaptrng to competltron and meeting
current European Union standards. Thrs pro-
cess. as yet incompletc, marks the start of rnter-
European economrc convergcnce and the ushcr-
mg m of greater stabilrty, not just in central
Europe but throughout thc entire continent
2. Regional geopolitical development
24 Economic diversrty has rts corollan' m
polrtics and a number of politrcal vanants u'hich
crther hark back to the past (prior to the advent
of socialism) or relate for example to rcligron or
social structure can be distrnguished These vari-
ants also act as a spur in leading the central
European countrics towards a shared perception
rvith the West of common values in society such
as democracy'. the free market (liberal or social,
depending on the partrcular cmphasis) and
respect for human rrghts Hence accession to
NATO and the European Unron seems nevrtable.
the more so as central European governments are
on the rvhole endeavounng, as best thel' can,
occasionallf in the face of strong mternal resis-
tance, to meet the condrtrons for membership of
both these organrsatrons, m the political as well
as the economic sphere
(a) The search for political stability
within and between states
25. The re-estabhshment or in some cases the
introduction of democracf in the central Euro-
pean countries has brought ma.;or changes in its
wake, both rvithrn states and rn terms of therr
intemational rclations. The results are encour-
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agmg on the rvhole but rn certarn cases the pro-
cess goes hand rn hand u'ith other factors, among
thcm the mtroductron of economrc reforms pro-
ducing ma1or soclal upheaval, u'hrch have been
the cause of cnses from Belarus to the Balkans
rvhose outcome rs still uncertain. Nevertheless
such a transition seems lrreversible, as the cvents
that have taken place in Serbia or Bulgana seem
to shorv, rvhere under the polrtrcal circumstances
specific to each countn'. governments have been
faced u'rth demonstratrons agamst electron-ng-
ging or polrtrcal or financral maladministratron
and forccd to grve rnto the demands of pubhc
opinron. These reactions serye to shorv the rcle-
vance of democratrc rdeals. even in societies
which are seemlnglv resigned to or passive m the
face of the authoritres in poxer.
26. To summanse the critena for anall,sis set
out at the start of thrs report, three groups of
countries can bc rdentrfied that t1pifr the range
of possible forms of regronal development
- 
a "hard core" of countries rvith sound
democratic rnstitutions which have
successfully' come through the test of a
change of govcrnment, and n'herc crvrl
liberties, partrcularll' press freedom and
tolerance of mrnorrtres, have become
firmly' estabhshed to the pomt u,here
thev are no longer open to challenge;
states rvhich strll have problems. rn
therr domestic or foreign affairs, rvhrch
are delay'ing thcrr progress tou'ards
implementrng commonlv accepted dem-
ocratic principles, such as freedom of
rnformatron, the right to political
drssent or ethmc minorrtl' rights,
a third group consrsting of countries,
happrly feu in number. u'here there is
uncertaintv over the u'a1' thel' are hkely'
to develop politrcalh', and u'here flag-
rant attacks on crvil libertres or acts of
insurrectron arc reportedly occurring.
27 Most WEU assoclatc partner countnes fall
unequivocalll' withrn the first group, although
some are not entirell' rvrthout reproach as far as
freedom of rnformatlon or respect for minority'
nghts are concerned Nevertheless a very defi-
rute rmprovement can be discerned despite the
uncertamtres weighing upon the polrtical future
of some of them 
- 
Bulgarra for rnstance 
- 
rvhich.
for the trme bemg at least havc emerged from
crlsrs The NATO and European Unron apph-
cants fall into thrs category and thc prospect of
mcmbcrshrp is a malor mcentive to them to com-
mrt themselves pubhclv to democratrc values and
therr rmplementation At the same timc, thc more
stable political institutions become, the bctter the
dralogue betu'een states, building a trust that
enables them to settle outstanding drsagreements
betrveen them. such as. for example the drspute
betu,een Hungary and Romania A lrttle further
to the east. Ukrame is also making satrsfactory
progress but rts future rs strll threatened by
factors that make for instability arisrng out of rts
relatrons rvrth the Russian Federation and the
part rts large Russran-speakrng communitl, mrght
play in this connection, partrcularll, rn the
Cnmea
28 The succcssor states of former Yugosla-
via, rvith the exceptron of Slovenia, fall rnto the
sccond category. In Croatia. the rnternal situa-
tion is still dependent on the outcome of the
Bosruan cnsis and thc countrl"s relatrons lrrth
Serbra. rvhich arc rn turn determrned by the
definrtron of the status of the populatrons of
Serbran ongm rn eastern Slavonia. Holvel'er, as
has happcned wrth Serbra, an improvement rn the
sttuation beyond Croatia's borders urll lessen the
gnp on power of the forces of natronahsm and
help speed up democratrc reform. Serbia has
entered a dehcate phase rvhere power rs shared
betrveen the ccntral authorities associated n'ith
President Mrlosevrc (now at the end of his term
of office) and the opposition, u'hrch has secured
control of the countn"s marn touns. The
restralnt drsplal'ed by'the trvo partres srnce their
confrontatron after local electron results lvere
cancelled illegally is an important indication of
the maturity of Serbian civrl socrety rvhrch, de-
sprte mternal divisrons w'ithrn the opposrtion,
offcrs an encouragmg prospect for the country's
transrtion to a genumelv democratic reglme
capable of settrng about resolving the Kosovo
problem
29. Bosrua and Herzegovina and the Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia are both for
drfferent reasons reaching a ma1or turning point
in their exrstence The rmplementation of the
political aspects of the Dalton Accords 
- 
settmg
up lornt tripartite mstitutrons. re-establishing
communlcation links and freedom of movement
and resrdence for the various commuruties 
- 
has
fallen u'ay behind schedule and rs clearly proving
10
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inadequate to guarantee lastrng peace after the
expiry of the mandate of the NATO stabrhsation
force (SFOR) in 1998. In the absence of an1,
genume progress in the attitude of the present
leaders, who see themselves prrmanly as repre-
sentatrves of their owrr communrties rather than
of the Bosnian people as a whole, European mstr-
tutions must muster their efforts lvith a view to
interverung more effectively rn the polrtical
sphere and not simplv confine themselves to pro-
vrdrng funds. As to thc Former Yugoslav Rep-
ublic of Macedonia, mternal development there
continues to be tied to the outcome of the
Albanian crisrs and the search for an equitable
compromlse over the rights of the Albanran
mmorrty m its territon, Maintarnrng a United
Natrons force on Macedonian sorl has helped
polrtical stability but there is no definrtrve solu-
tion in sight to the Albanran question
30 Albania provrdes the perfect illustratron of
the third group of countries referred to earhcr
Although, through lack of consensus, no decrsion
on humarutarian interventron has been possrble
rvithin the European Unron or NATO, all e1,es
are upon it since its future politrcal and economrc
development affect the cntrre Balkan regron and,
to the west, Itall'. A large number of Albanrans
live outside the country"s borders, in Kosovo or
in the Former Yugoslav Repubhc of Macedonia.
Relatrons are fractrous u,ith the Serbian central
authorrties and uneasv urth those in Skopje. If
the destabihsation of Albanra rvere to lead to the
collapse of organrsed government (whether Pres-
ident Bcnsha stay's or goes) and the creation of
no-go areas under the control of politrcised or
cnminal armed gangs, Kosovo and the Former
Yugoslav Rcpubhc of Macedonta mrght also be-
come destabilised by extension, ulth arms flou-
ing into those regrons. Such a situation u'ould
doubtless lead to represslve measures agarnst the
resrdent Albanian community and grve rise to a
massive exodus first towards Albania and then to
the surroundrng countries, including Greece and
Ital1,. That possibility was one of the factors
entenng into the calculation w'hen a European
military intervention force was constituted under
Itahan command Frnding a solution to the
present cnsis is therefore mandatory, not just for
the Albanrans but for the European Union as
well.
31. In a drfferent context, developments in
Belarus are grving cause for concern, both on
account of the attacks on democracl' and human
nghts violatrons that are taking place and
because of the geopolitrcal rmplications of the
srtuatron there. Withm the country potver ls con-
centrated in the hands of a democratrcally-elected
president who rs adoptrng an incrcasmglv auth-
oritarian politrcal stance. This attrtude has led to
senous criticism on the part of European
instrtutrons and to the suspension of Unrted
States economic ard. At the same timc, Presrdent
Lukashenko has commrtted hrmself to a foreign
policl' essentrallv drrected tox'ards the Russran
Federation and has made plain hrs opposrtron to
NATO cnlargement by' proposing that if Poland
jorns, nuclear affns should once again be
statroncd on Belarus's territory The lack of any
organised oppositron rvith rvidespread popular
support, as there is in Serbia and Bulgarra,
makes it difficult to exert any, influence ovcr the
course of events and the Russran Federatron
alone appears to have the whereu'ithal to halt thc
drift towards authoritarianism rvhich threatens to
cut the country off from the gencral trend
torvards democracy, observable throughout
central Europe
(b) hospects for integration in European and
tr an satlan tic str uctur e s for co op er ation
32. The openrng-up of NATO and European
Uruon membershrp to certam central European
countries marks a hrstonc turning point for the
reglon smce it heralds the end of the division of
the contment mto t$,o drstrnct regions, a western
and an eastem half 
- 
the first somervhat superfi-
cially charactensed bl' membership of the Atlan-
tic Alliance and the European instrtutrons and the
second made up of former "socialist bloc" states
Holever, the reality rs more complex. for not all
states rvrthrn the transatlantic and European
organisations have the same rights and obhga-
trons. This is becoming mcreasinglv apparent as
far as the European Union is concemed, both
rvith regard to the implementatron of certam com-
mon policies (in the socral field or the CFSP
area), u'here the United Kingdom and Denmark
are entitled to a serres of "opt outs", and in the
run-up to the single currency lvith all the dis-
agreements over crrterra
33 Withrn NATO, cnlargement, actively sup-
ported by'the main Alliance member, the United
States, no\\' seems to bc a foregone conclusron
for three central European states at least: the
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Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland Romanra
and Slovenra are also potentral candrdates for the
first u'ave of accessions and there rs no lack of
declarattons of support, grven the concern to
maintain a balance rn the southern part of the
contment It is possrble that most of the other
candidates. from the Baltrc states to the Balkans,
could be rncluded m a second round of enlarge-
ment. There are still three major unknowns
Russran Federation reactlon to the decrsron on
w'hrch countrres are to lorn and the start of the
ncgotratrons leadrng to therr assimilation rnto
NATO structures. developments in Ukraine
n'hrch rs to srgn an agreement establishing pref-
erentral relatrons u'rth the Alhance, and the out-
come of the process for ratrfication of the
enlargement b1' parliaments of Alhance member
countries 
- 
by no means a foregone conclusron.
34. It is strll too soon to judgc u'hether this
process represents a step tou'ards greater reg-
ional stabilitl'or an inrtrahve essentrallv rntcnded
to give NATO a ne\\' lease of hfe (after the
demise of the USSR and the mrlrtan' threat it
represcnted), but rt rs clear that it must take place
gradually' rf all the mrlrtan' and political struc-
tures of the Alliance are not to be reorgarused at
onc fcll s\\'oop and preparations made for thc
direct confrontatron rvrth the Russian Federation
that rs bound to happen rfthe apphcations ofthe
thrcc Baltrc statcs are accepted. This is a
materral fact u'hrch has to be taken into account
evcn rfcertarn central and eastern European gov-
ernments. including the strongest applicants, find
rt unpalatable. Enlargement must go hand in
hand rvrth buildrng up a relatronshrp of trust u'ith
the Russian Federatron. x,ith mtemal reform of
the Alhance rnhich also has to do u'rth Sparn2 and
France being reassrmrlated rnto rts mrlrtary
structures and rvith the relatronship betu'een
2 Spain's full assimrlatron into NATO's mrlrtarl
structures was accompanied by a request to havc a
subregional command stationed on Spanish sorl.
covenng the u'hole of rts 
- 
pemnsular and island 
-
territory and to be the host countrJ' to a core CJTF
headquarters . For the present, drscussrons betueen
Madnd and the Alhance military authorities are
contlnulng (see article entrtled "Espafla deluelve por
'rnaceptable' el documento inicral de la OTAN
sobrc su cstructura mrlitar [Spain rejects NATO's
prelimrnarl' report on its military structure, on
grounds of unacceptabrlityl". El Pais , 6 April 1997
andAtlonhc.\'ew.s, 9 April 1997).
NATO and certain central and northern Euro-
pean countries (Austrra and Frnland for ex-
ample). This rs a drplomatrc and a polrtrcal
challenge with ma;or financial rmplicatrons3,
whrch ls reason enough for the gradual and
selective approach adopted. since the conse-
quences of an enlargement that farled to take
account ofsuch factors could usher in a perrod of
rnstabrlity' ln tcrms of the contrnent's security.
35. Pcndrng decrsions to be taken w'hen the
mtcrgovernmcntal conference's work is over, the
Europcan Union rs itself preparing for enlarge-
ment although at a markedly slower pace than
NATO Thrs rs rn part because of the decision-
makrng processes rvrthrn the European mstrtu-
tions rn rvhrch the Councrl of Mrnisters, the
Commission and thc Europcan Parhamcnt are all
involved and whrch arc follolved by ratification
by' each indivrdual natronal parliamcnt. Economrc
and technical criteria here assume specral im-
portance, absent to an extent from the dcbatc on
NATO, and all the present members are intent on
defendrng therr orrn partlcular rnterests in thrs
sphere to the last, even to the point of usrng therr
veto. This is especialll'true rvith regard to the
conxnon agncultural policy or structural dev-
elopment funds, for example. Notrvrthstandrng
pubhc statements rt is obvious that EU
enlargement to include the central European
countnes rull necessarilv involve long and diffi-
cult negotratrons u'hrch, moreover, will take place
at a crucral trme for thc future of the European
mstrtutrons
36 Tuo major topics will in fact have an rn-
drrect influence on thc succcss of thosc negotia-
tions, the first connected with the results of the
IGC and the practical outcomc of thc understand-
rng reached in Dublin whrch commits the Unron
3 Accordrng to a report from the Amencan State
Department to Congress. dated 2.1February 1997, on
NATO enlargement "the total costs of NATO en-
largement for a first group of neu' members 
- 
costs
to the United States. current members and new
members combrned 
- 
urll be on average about $2.1
to $2 7 billron per year. for a total of $27-35 brllion
.. between 1997 . through 2009. ... The US share
of these overall costs rvrll average Sl50 -200 million
per )'ear . ." The cost to the nerl' members (the
report does not sa)'hou'man1') rs estrmated at "$800
mrllion to $l brlhon per year or a total of $10-13
bilhon from 1997-2009"
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to openrng negotiatrons on the accession of
Cyprus withrn six months of the close of the con-
ferencc and the second being the settrng-up of
monetary union which will in practice create a
trvo-tier Union. Failure of the negotiatrons on
Cyprus, rvhich also have an indirect bcaring on
relations betu'een Turkey' and the European
Unron, will have rmphcations for any follorv-up
enlargement, despite optrmistic statements about
accession by this or that central European state
early' next century; hence the idea of entering into
discussions rvrth ten countries in the region,
(those urth tres urth the Union through associa-
tion or Europe agreements) and C1prus and Tur-
key. However thrs is far from satisf ing those
involved and could create tension betrveen them
m view ofthe fact that their chances at the outset
are not equal and no consensus has emerged
among Union members on a specific timeframc,
or as regards procedures or the timetable
37. Trming is in fact a crucral factor here since
convergence of the central European economtes
rvith the standards requrred for possible acces-
sron (drscounting for the present the rssue of the
smgle currency) demands reforms that are at
trmcs difficult to implement because of therr
social implications and rvhrch can lead to malor
protest with electoral consequenccs that could
prove a source of rnstabilitv It is cssentral that
the authorities in porver can explain the reason
why' such sacnfices are bemg sought, not soleh'
in terms of markct economlcs but by reference to
a specific and quantifiable goal that their people
can identifi,' with 
- 
full mcmbership, in other
rvords, of the instrtutions lvhich have today come
to slmbolisc Europe. Failurc to take account of
thrs factor from the outset u'ould help create
expectations that could arouse misunderstandings
and grve rise to conflrcts of rnterests, rather than
strengthening the feeling of belonging to a real
communitv of states based on shared values.
38. Whatever the outcome of the enlargement
processes, rvhich rt rs hoped will succced for the
sake of greater stabrlrty' and prosperitf in Eur-
ope, the main effort must come from the central
European countrres themselves It rs also up to
them better to coordmate their efforts to defend
therr natronal intercsts in the commg negotiations
and to represent the vre*'s of those of their
neighbours whrch have no prospect for the time
being of membershrp either immcdrately or m the
short term Othenrrse the policy of every man
for himself rs ultimatelv likch' to prove counter-
productrve, give rise to divrsrons and prove a
source of instability and insecurity for a farr
number of states, among them the most
wlncrable. for example. the Baltic states or the
southern and Balkan countrres. Accession must
not be an end rn rtself, the ultrmate goal is to
strengthen securitv and stabrlrtl', rvithout rvhrch
prosperity and economic development in the
longer term are not possrble.
III. The future of regional cooperation
39. In the earlv 1,ears of the present decade,
u'hrch sarv the demise of the Warsaw Pact and
COMECON. rts economic corollary, a signifi-
cant numbcr of cooperation inrtiatives of all
kinds 
- 
economlc, political or envlronmental 
-
came into cffect. Some of them greu, mto true
mstitutrons, acquiring a councrl of ministers and
in some cases a parhamentary assembh'. At the
same trme, the central European countries took
their place as full members of the Councrl of
Europe and the OSCE and drerv closer to NATO
(through NACC and the Partnership for Pcace),
thc European Union (through the Europe and
other association agreements) and WEU (through
assocrate partner status). Those countncs whose
economic reforms xcre furthest advanced also
loined the OECD (thc Czech Republic, Hungary
and Poland) and some set up multrlateral struc-
tures for dialogue rvrth European Union mem-
bers, such as the Weimar trianglc u'hich brrngs
together German\,, France and Poland.
40. Today', in the run-up to the decisions on
NATO and EU enlargement. there is a case for
questioning the meaning and future of the various
forums for cooperation lvhich have been created
m central Europe. While the justification for the
Baltrc Councrl and the Central European Initra-
trvc rs still quite obvrous. the Visegrad Group
and the Central European Free Trade Agrecment
(CEFTA) are unlikely to survive for ven'much
longcr if most of their members. possrblv all of
thcm. accede to NATO and the European Union
rn the near futurc. Ho\r,ever, given that the
prospccts for accession to the European and
transatlantic mstrtutrons are not the same for all,
the existence of dialogue and cooperation
arrangements in central Europe rvrll contribute to
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palliating the fear of marginahsation felt by those
left out of the first wave.
41. This depends largely on the position the
"n€w members" adopt. they will erther put up a
robust defence of their orm national mterests in
the Unron and the Alliance or help create closer
links between those organisations and their
regronal neighbours, along the lines of the dia-
logue the Mediterranean countries of the Euro-
pean Union are trying to estabhsh with the coun-
tries on the southern shore. Such an approach
would also strengthen central Europe's presence
in the conduct of European political and eco-
nomic affairs in the wider sense and in definrng
new secunty structures for the continent
1. The institutional framework
42 Central European cooperaflon is spread
across a number of frameworks which either
brrng together a small number of contiguous
states or take in countries that are not regarded
as part of the area. Therr aims are diverse and
concrete progress has by and large been limited
in scope, although significant inasmuch as tt rep-
resents the expresston of a shared determrnation
to resolve certam problems affecting central
Europc ranging from the economy to the environ-
ment through dialogue and consultation. Poli-
tical and securitv questrons nevertheless remain a
sensitrve arca and the mrtiatrves taken are often
the outcome of brlateral or jornt action with
rvestern European countries that are members of
NATO or the European Union Here too, a parl-
iamentary dimension has emerged which is
contributing to strengthenrng dialogue with a
vierv to finding solutrons to regional problems.
(a) hospects for political
and economic cooperation
43. The evolutron of central Europe rn the
1990s is also marked by the renewal of hrstorical
ties severed during the cold war. The transition
to parhamentary democracy and a market econ-
omy' has occurred at a speed and through
processes that are specific to each state. The
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, whrch had
prevrously had a parliamentary tradition and
where economic reforms got offthe ground in the
early 1990s, have quickly reverted to the polrtrcal
norrns shared b1, most so-called western Euro-
pean states ln other instances, such as Bulgana
and Romania, such changes rvere effected rvith
drffrculty and even with violence, producing
unstable srtuations that are still with us 
- 
in the
former case at least. In the Balkans, the former
Yugoslav and Albanian crises are sttll a source
ofconcern and the prospects for economic devel-
opment and for strengthenrng democratrc institu-
trons remain tenuous. The Baltic states qurckly
realised that in order to deal with pressure from
the Russran Federation, they must enhance
exrsting cooperation among them by revrving the
Baltic Council and endeavouring to create a
co[rmon economic area.
44. Institutions for cooperation have thus been
born to meet either the concern to coordinate
what are perceived to be common endeavours in
the political and economic spheres, or to create a
forum for dialogue and discussion to resolve
problems affectrng certain areas or countries. In
parallel, links with the European and transatlan-
trc organisations, viewed as a priority by most
central European states, have been strengthened.
In this respect, the achievements of regional init-
iatives are of a fairly' modest order as none is
capable of replacing or even providing a credrble
backup to NATO or the European Union. Having
ruled out the possibility of considering political
and secunty matters, as all but the Baltic Council
have done, these miscellaneous institutions are
restncted to areas where understanding ls per-
haps more easrly reached, such as social prob-
lems or the envrronment.
45. However these are by no means minor
concerns and moreover have an effect on stability
in central Europe, as our Committee was in a
position to appreciate rvhen drawing up its report
on parliamentary cooperatron in the Black Sea
areat but there are also examples of inactton or a
lack of a common political desrgn within certarn
organisations, such as the Central European Init-
iatrve, initially a helpless witness to the violent
drsintegration of one of its founder members
(former Yugoslavia) and now powerless in the
face of the Albanian crisis, or the Visegrad
Group whose members are coming fonvard
precemeal to join NATO and the European
Unron. Also, agam refernng agam to Black Sea
Cooperation, the fact that Greece and Turkey are
a Parliamentary cooperation in the Black Sea area,
Document 1544; Rapporteurs Sir John Hunt and
Ms Aytaman; 4 November 1996.
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members, or indeed the Russian Federatron and
Ukrarne, has not brought about any lessening of
the abrdrng tensions between those countnes 
-
over C1'prus and the Aegean continental shelf rn
the case of the former or NATO enlargement and
Cnmea m relatron to the latter.
46. Admittedly one should not overstate the
case by failing to take account of the fact that
these are organisations rvhich operate as forums
for dialogue and cooperation, takrng small steps
fonvard towards establishing better relationships
betrveen neighbours and contributing to an im-
provcment in hvrng standards though shared
experience and advice on social, envrronmental
and human nghts rssues They are not committed
to bringing about polrtrcal or economrc integra-
tion which explams why progress is hmrted m
those areas CEFTA rs another example of the
kind of initratrve which is a response to a particu-
lar economic situation and u,ill probably not sur-
vive the likely accession of the malority of rts
members to the European Unron. Hence it seems
clear that the arms and, rn partrcular, the polrtrcal
and economlc resources allocated to it rvrll be
limited to certain practrcal measures u'hich, rvhen
the time comes, wrll not constltute an obstacle to
European Union entr1 .
47. The Baltrc Council at present offers an
example of consistencl' of aims and resources in
political, economlc and secunty terms. The
creation of a loint battalion draun from the three
states (Estorua, Latvia and Lithuania) to take
part rn peacekeeprng tasks is a sign of a clear
politrcal wrll, although one not entrrelv devoid of
ambrgurty. Thus Estonia, supported by the
Nordrc countries of the European Union, seems
to want to go it alone in applyrng for accession,
whrle the prospects of NATO entrl' are for the
moment uncertain as far as all three countrres are
concerned. It is vital for the Baltic states to shorv
a united front on these issues, despite any
differences they may have over other matters.
Otherwrsc divisions will appear that may make
them more r,ulnerable to pressure from the
Russian Federation ln the context of their
relations with that country
48 In actual fact, regional cooperatron at
multilateral Ievel has never really got off the
ground. The variety of economic and politrcal
chorces, differing priorities on all sides, coupled
with minoritv and border disputes, represent so
many' obstacles to any movement in that direc-
tron. Parilcrpatron in the u'ork of the OSCE and
the Councrl of Europe seems hou'evcr to be morc
active. even though therc appears to be no pnor
coordmatron betrveen thc various countries, as is
sometimes the case betueen European Uruon or
NATO member states. Contacts estabhshed in
such forums have contributed to positive moves
towards strengthening democratic rnstitutions and
observing minority rights, and have encouraged
dialogue leading to the settlcment of vanous
krnds of drsputes, such as between Hungary and
Romanra. The exrstence of interparhamentary'
assemblies lvithrn these rnstitutions has also
play'ed a decisrvc part in the process.
(b) The importance of the
int er p ar liament ary dimen s io n
49 The development of "parliamentary diplo-
macy" in parallel to action by governments 
-
including rts role m central Europe 
- 
has already
bccn the sublcct of several reports b1' the Com-
mrttee. The elected asscmblies participate act-
rvely, through brlateral contacts and interpar-
liamentary rnstitutions, in strengthening democ-
rac1, and stabilrty withrn the regron. Well to the
fore is the Parliamentary Assembll, of the Coun-
cil of Europe. Thc fact that rt brings together
virtually all the countries of the contrnent.
including the Russian Federation, confers espec-
ral rmportance on rt as a forum for debate on the
future of democratrc reform. human and mmoritv
rights compliance and environmental qucstrons.
The Assembll' makes a major contnbutron to
strengthening democratrc institutions b1, organ-
ising regular seminars and conferences on parl-
iamentary topics and also provides assistance of
a specialist nature to the parliaments of the cen-
tral European countrres and certam successor
states of the former Sovret Union.
50 The OSCE Assembly is a ncwcomer to the
interparliamcntar,' sccnc, but is concerned rvrth
other, more political, rssues, urth a greater bear-
ing on security and stability Conflict preven-
tion, crisis managemcnt and election monitoring
tasks are the Assembly's most rmportant spheres
of actrvity, and rt follou's up any actron under-
taken b1'the OSCE executive authoritres. More-
over the Parhamentary Assembly has a major
advantage in that it covers an extremcly' u'ide
area, extending as far as the Caucasus and
central Asia, as rvell as numbering the United
15
DOCLIN4ENT I568
States among rts members The countrres of
ccntral Europc thus have a forum for debatrng
and cndeavouring to resolve questrons uith a
direct bearrng on therr stabrlrtl' and secuntv.
5l On a smaller scalc, the Parhamentan'
Conference of the Central European Inrtrative has
the advantage of greater homogcneitt', u'hich can
be helpful xhen solutrons are berng sought to
regronal problems It provides its sixteen
membcrs rvith a frameu-ork for dialoguc that rs
cssentiallv drrected tou'ards economic, lcgal and
cnvironmental matters. In this respect, the Con-
fcrence bears somethrng of a resemblance to the
Parliamentary Assembll' of Black Sea Economrc
Cooperatron in terms of rts membership smce it
brings together central European and European
Union countrres (Austna and Italv for the CEI
and Greece as a member of PABSEC). These
smaller organrsations foster closer cooperation
among therr mcmbers, makrng rt easrer for them
to rdentifl' the problems thel' have rn corrrmon
and possrblc solutrons to thcm
52 Further northrvards, the Baltic Assembll'.
whrch has alreadv been drscussed b1' thc
Committee5. is strll the onll' example of a parl-
iamentan' instrtutron consrstrng solell' of central
European countries It thrs it reflects the
particular charactenstrcs of rts three mcmbcrs,
all of u.hom, desprte formal drfferences in the
u'av each conducts rts economrc policl' or rts
quest for assimilation into the European rnstr-
tutions, have the feeling of belongrng to a
communrtv of rnterests based rn part on therr
common history and deriving today from therr
perceptron of the need to present a uruted front to
the Russian Federatron The absence of anl'
prospect of therr joinrng NATO in the near futurc
can onlv strengthen thrs scnse of unrty and urll
perhaps lead to further integration. both of thcrr
economies and as far as securitv rs concerned,
rlhrle rn other parts of the regron the closeness of
Alliance and Union enlargcment mav at trmes
producc a retreat from the sohdantv that brnds
countncs bclongrng to the same organisatron, as
in the case of the Visegrad Group
53. The North Atlantic Asscmbly might also
be cited as an example, although it is not the
parliamentary component of NATO but an
t The Baltrc Assembh'. Document 1.160,
Rapporteur. Mr Masseret, 22 May 1995
informal mstrtutron rvhich also plays a very use-
ful part m furthenng parhamentarv drplomacl'
and strcngtherung democracl' through debate on
all the various aspects of defence lssues: eco-
nomrc. social, technical and ecologrcal. The
Assembh'has a malor instrument for cooperation
rvrth central European parhaments, in the ambr-
tious programme of activitres known as the Rose-
Roth initratrve, to x'hrch the Committee has
already'made reference in a report on parhamen-
tary cooperatron uith the WEU assoclate part-
6-,ncrs" I hc semrnars and colloquies orgarused
under its ausprces provrde an opportunrty' for
exchanges of views on such sublects as demo-
cratrc control over the armed forces or the role of
parhaments rn the drscussron of defence issues,
thus contrrbutrng to a sharing of experience of
bencfit to all natronal parhaments.
54 Lrke polrtrcal cooperation, the interparlia-
mentary drmension rs better developed rvithin the
pan-European and transatlantrc mstrtutrons than
among the central European states. Bilateral co-
operation exists, but wrth the exception of
Estonra, Latvia and Lithuania, few countries
have set up real central European interparliamen-
tan' drscussron forums. prefernng, to all intents
and purposes, to devclop drrcct contacts between
natronal assemblies. This rs a telhng reminder of
the diversitl' of interests and perceptions that
characterrses the regron and lvhich the European
Unron rvill have to takc mto account u'hen nego-
tratrons begrn over the accessron of neu' mem-
bers WEU rs also concerned rvrth such issues,
smce the status of somc of its assocrate partncrs
rs hkely- to evolve as NATO and the European
mstrtutrons enlarge, and the Assembll' has an
rmportant part to plal' rn thc context of interparl-
iamentan' cooperation.
2. Interaction with the European Union
and IVEU
55 The Europcan instrtutions, often decried
by thc member states. undenrabll' exerclse a
porverful attractron for the states of central
Europe. Thev represent an area of economic
development and regional polrtrcal stabrlitv.
governed by common rules that applv to all and
at the samc trme take account of cach member's
6 Parliamentary cooperatron u'rth the countnes of
thc WEU Forum of Consultation, Document l4l-1;
Rapporteur. Srr Russell Johnston. .1 May 1994
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mterests. The Union rs also an extremely'
lmportant economrc focus in the uorld and is
setting up structures for mtervenrng politrcallv.
erther in the context of future enhanced co-
operatron or ln a framervork common to the
majority of member states. Since the signing of
the Maastricht Treatl', WEU's involvement has
been sought in strengthening the political role of
the European Union rn the framervork of imple-
mentation of the common foreign and security
policl' (CFSP). From that standpornt, rt seems
logrcal for certain central European countries
which are not to join NATO in the near future to
want to speed up the negotratron process for
entry to the Unron
(a) European Union responsibilities
56. Today the European Union is central Eur-
ope's princrpal trading partner. In parallel to
traditional economic tres, the European institu-
tions are pursuing a raft of economrc assistance
prograrnmes such as TACIS, Interreg II and
Phare, from xhich all states rn the region bcnefit,
includrng the successor states of the former
Soviet Uruon. The Unron particrpates activell'rn
reconstruction prograrnmes in Bosnia and Herze-
govina and Albanra's frail economy is almost
rvholly dependent on European aid. This is an
immutable fact but one not matched by' a politi-
cal effort on the scale required. This stems from
a pecuharrty' of the Union 
- 
the cheek by jowl
existence of a communitl' process covcrmg areas
that are essentialll'economic and an mtergovern-
mental dimension. the CFSP
57 . Decisrons are more easrll' taken under thc
first of these systems, rrrespectrvc of rvhether
they' involve establishing preferential relations
lr-ith central European states through Europe or
association agreements or negotratrng aid in the
framework of existing programmes, as the areas
thel' cover are technrcal b.v and large, with long-
term politrcal imphcatrons but no direct impact
on the way the European rnstitutions operate.
Converseh', CFSP decisions involve all member
states reaching agreement on a given objective 
-
this is specifically the European Council's field
of action This means there is alu,a1's the pos-
sibility of stalemate, as was the experrence u,ith
the crises m former Yugoslavra and Albania. As
far as enlargement goes, the go-ahead for open-
ing negotiations should pnmarily be a decision
u'hrch rs taken under thc responsrbrlity of the
European Councrl, hence a polrtical decrsron rvrth
rmphcatrons in terms of the CFSP
58. So long as they fall strictll,rvrthin the eco-
nomic sphere. decisions are taken on the basrs of
technical cntcria such as horv much progress has
been madc on reform, grouth rates, inflatron,
pubhc sector deficits etc. Based on these factors.
certain central European countnes are potential
applicants for admission in the short term, while
for others the process lvrll take longer The
major drfficultl, hes in the necd to adapt exrsting
instrtutrons to a further enlargement, u'hich rm-
plies a reform of both decision-making proced-
ures and Commissron and European Parhament
membership. These are all essentiall)' political
matters, whrch the intergovemmental conference
should attempt to address. In the absence of insti-
tutional reform, the assimilatron of new members
may, lead to stalemate at executive level rvith
economically deleterious consequenccs
59 Another factor to be taken mto account are
the polrtical rmphcations of the implementation
of monetary union w'hrch rvill crcate de facto a
two-tier European Unron, u'ith one tier more
closelv integrated than the other It rs clear that
the countnes u'hrch adopt the single currency will
be in a position to impose therr polrtical and eco-
nomic choices on the remarnrng members. The
same arguments can be apphed to dcveloping
closer cooperatlon, especrallr, if this is at the
instigatron of the more powerful natrons The
politrcal sensitrvity attaching to the implementa-
tion of these plans gives nse to reservations and
objectrons even urthin those states with the
heavrest commrtment to such a course of actron
for it ultimatelv requires wholesale reform of the
n'orking of the European rnstitutions instead of
the multiplicatron and supenmposrtron of u,ork-
ing structures.
60 Under these circumstances and becausc of
uncertaintv over the outcome of the IGC, rt is
logical not to seek to enlarge too rapidlv and to
first test out the reforms enlargement is likely to
entail. The parallelism it is hoped rn some quar-
ters to establish betrveen NATO and the Euro-
pean Union has no real justificatron, for we are
here deahng with different types of organisatrons
rvith drfferent ob.;cctrves. It should be added that
the central European states are not the onlv ones
mterested in acceding to the Union; there are also
such sensrtrve cases as C1prus and Turkey rvhere
t7
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bad or rushed handhng mrght provoke a serrous
cnsls ln relatrons betrveen the latter and the
European Unron All thcse factors make it drffr-
cult to take concrete decrsrons about admrtting
nerv members, dcspite thc support some apph-
cants can boast of from ccrtarn maJor Umon
members.
61. In the short and medium term the Euro-
pean institutions must deepcn their relationship
wrth the ccntral European states b1' helprng them
ahgn therr standards ri'rth thosc of the Umon and
through closer polrtical cooperation with them
At the same time future reforms must take ac-
count of enlargement, in other rvords thel' must
cnvlsage the rmphcations the entrl' of the central
European countrres will have on its mstrtutronal
u'orkrngs, ensurlng that decrsion-makrng rs not
obstructed or too great a burden placcd on com-
munrtv budgets. Transparcncy and dialogue havc
a most rmportant role to plav here and it rs
esscntial that a trmetable sctting out clear oblcc-
tives rs fixed to allorv potential candrdates to pre-
pare therr case and justrfl' to therr orrn peoplcs
the sacrifices alreadr-agreed to or strll required
Successful internal reform ls one of the condi-
trons for successful enlargement, which rs an
lmportant objective for achievrng greater stabrlrtt,
and regional development. but one that must not
be regarded as an end rn rtself To belong to the
Unron rs to belong to a communrty of values and
take part rn frammg a corrrmon vlsron of Eur-
ope's role rn the ll'orld, rncluding in relatron to
security matters.
(b) Ll/EU,s role?
62 Smce 1994 WEU has involved in rts
actrvrtres those central European states rvhrch
have signed Europe or assoclatron agreements
rvith the European Union Ten countnes to date
have been accorded associate partner status m
our Orgamsatron and as such are consulted
regularlv and attend meetings of the Council of
Minrsters In parallel, WEU has estabhshed
contacts rvith thc Russian Federatron and
Lrkraine and the French Presideno'. u'hose term
of offrce cxpires on 30 June, has made clear its
mtention of developing closer rclatrons wrth the
latter in matters relatrng to space and strategic
hft. Nevertheless, none of the ten associate part-
ners can aspire to full membership in the near
future because of the polrtical and legal tres that
exrst betu'een WEU and NATO on the one hand
and WEU and the European Union on the other.
63. It must also be acknorvlcdged that no cen-
tral European country has 1'et offrcrally ex-
pressed a desire to become a contracting party to
the modified Brussels Treatl' Priontl' here is
being grven to the Alliance and the European
Union, n'hrch can be explained rn part by thc lack
of a real rdentrt,v specrfic to WEU, rvhrch tends to
be confused lvith the other two organisatrons.
Nevertheless involvement in its actrvities, in par-
allel urth the Partnership for Peace and NACC,
grves the central European countries the oppor-
tunrty to make knoun therr interests and expect-
ations rvith rcgard to European sccurity. This
does not of course meet thcir demand for a sec-
untv guarantee, which in therr vierv can onll' be
provided by the Unrted States.
64. Alhance enlargement rvrll only mvolve a
[mrted number of states (three or four) and it rs
to be expected that mcreased pressure rvrll be
brought to bear for closer hnks betrveen WEU
and those not rncluded in the first wave. These
u,rll be vcry drfficult to achieve w'ithout further
changcs to the exrsting statuscs of countnes that
are not full membcrs. basrcally the associate
members. Todal'there are threeT and in three or
four years their number u'ill srvell to six or seven.
It should not be forgotten that they have a decr-
srve influence over WEU's conduct of milrtary
operatrons rnvolving the CJTF (combined joint
task forces) pnncipalll'bv vrrtue oftherr seats on
the North Atlantic Councrl. For the time being,
as far as such matters go, maintaining the status
quo and brdrng time are the order of the day but
once NATO enlargement is undenvay, and the
IGC has completcd rts u'ork, thought will need to
be grven withrn WEU to a new workmg frame-
u'ork for the central European states.
65. The Assembll' rvill also need to keep a
close uatch at all times on these changes. As far
as its powers are concerned, rt rs bound by'the
modrfied Brussels Treaty and can only reflect in
its oun u'ork the pohcy torvards the central
European states that the Council has defined. Its
room for manoeuvre rs also limited by, the re-
quirement for rts oun delegations to be rdentical
n'rth those of the Parhamentary Asscmbly of the
Councrl of Europe, an obligation rvritten mto
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Article IX of the Treaty Moreover it too is
waiting for the outcome of the IGC to find out
what implications there are for WEU and thrs
makes it diffrcult to forecast what its future rela-
tions u'ith the parliaments of central Europe are
likely to be. In general terms and given its fairly
modest means, the Assemblv has managed to
establish close contacts lvith the parliaments of
thc associate partner countries and their concerns
are frequently reflected in the reports submitted
by rts committees
66. Even rf they have no voting rights, the
associate partners are actively involved in the
work of the Assembly; they are fully, rnvolved in
sessions and colloquies and there are regular
committee visits to those countries and elservhere
(Bosma and Herzegovina, the Russian Federation
or Ukraine for example) for exchanges of views
and open debate on defence and security ques-
tions that affect them. It is clear that the various
associate statuses will have to be modificd and
the rights and duties of the countries concerned
clarified as their posrtrons vis-i-vis NATO and
the European Union evolve, but the impetus must
come first and foremost from the Council rvhich
alone is able to revise or interpret the modified
Brussels Treaty.
67 The choices that are to be made thrs year
rvrthm the Alliance and the European Union wrll
radicalll' change the central European landscape.
The expectations of somc countries rvrll be met
whrle others will have to wait a u'hile longer and
develop and adjust to the nelv European configu-
ratron. However this is merely one stage in a
long process of assimilatron in which the entrre
continent rs involved, through the many frame-
r.r'orks for political, economic, security, welfare
and environmental cooperation Neither are
NATO and the European Union, whrch are the
focus of attention, themselves perfect or everlast-
ing structures and they essentrally operate on the
basis of finel1,-balanced compromises, in con-
stant evolution The central European countries'
impatience to 1om these instrtutions as quickly as
possible is understandable but an ill-considered
and hasty enlargement would run the rrsk of
weakening the tu.o organisations, or even of
deflecting them from therr goals, even though 
-
and this should not be forgotten 
- 
they reprcsent
the fruit of more than forty years of working
together.
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Chronology of the main events in central and eastern Europe since 1994
1994
9 May WEU/central Europe 
- 
the forergn affairs and defence minrsters of the nine WEU member
states approve the creation of an assocrate partner status at Krrchberg (Luxembourg) This status was
granted to nine central and eastern European countnes 
- 
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romarua and Slovakra.
24May Ukraine 
- 
the leadershrp of the Crimea region and the central government agree to estabhsh a
working partl'with the aim of reducing tensions between the tu'o parties.
June-July' Greece/Albania 
- 
the Greek Government expels thousands of Albanian illegal immigrants in
response to measures taken b1'the Albanran Government against the Greek ethnic mmority in Albania.
14 June. Ukraine/EU 
- 
srgnature of a partnershrp agreement.
22 Jung Russia.rNATO 
- 
Russia becomes a member of NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) pro-
grarnme.
l0 July: [Ikraine 
- 
Leonid Kuchma wins the Presidentral electrons with 52.14%o of the vote, against
45 06% for Leonid Kravchuk, the outgorng President.
27 Jdy'. Ukraine 
- 
opening of drscussions rvith the IMF on setting up an economic reform prograrnme.
7 September. Albania/Greece 
- 
crisis between Greece and Albanra after an Albanran court condemned
six Greek-speaking Albanians for spying for a foreign porver.
7 October Bulgaria 
- 
President ZhelTu Zhelev dissolves the Natronal Assembly and calls elections.
l6 November: Ukraine 
- 
Parliament ratifies the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT)
I I December Russia/Chechnl'a 
- 
outbreak of rvar in Chechnva
l8 December. Bulgarra 
- 
general elections and victory for the Bulganan Socialist Party (BSP).
199s
Slovenia/CEFTA 
- 
Slovenra accedes to the Central European Free Trade Agreement
Early January Russra/Chechnya 
- 
Russian offensive in Chechnl'a, Groznv taken b1, federal troops
l1 January. BelarusAIATO 
- 
Belarus becomes the24th signatory of the Partnership for Peace.
26 Juru,ary'. Bulgarra 
- 
a new government takes office under the leadershrp of Zhan Videnov, President
of the Bulganan Sociahst Party'.
I February: Hungan'- signature by the foreign ministcr of the Council of Europe's Conventron on the
Protection of Natronal Minorities.
8 Februarl': Estonra/Latvra/Lithuania 
- 
inauguration of a tramrng centre for the Baltrc Battalion in
Riga The Baltrc Battalion, the first joint militan' unit draun from the three Baltic states, is intended to
improve regronal secunty and to particrpate m peacekeeping operations abroad.
9 February. Albania 
- 
four Greek-speakrng Albanians condemned for treason and illegal arms
possessron in September 1994 are released after the Court of Appeal finds there rvere procedural
irregularitrcs
9 Februarl' Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) 
- 
Parhament passes a law forbrdding
the use of thc Albanian language on rdentrty cards and passports despite protests from representatives of
the Albanian minorrtl'.
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l0 February. Austria,rNATO 
- 
Austria becomes the 25th srgnatory of the Partnershrp for Peace
l6-17 February: Poland/Russia 
- 
visrt to Poland by Viktor Chernomyrdin leading to the srgnature of an
agreement on the construction of a 650 km stretch of gas pipeline on Pohsh territory.
17 February: Poland/United States 
- 
srgnature in Washington of a defence and cooperation agreement
bl,defence ministers Jerzy Milewski and William Perry'rvhrch covers shared mrlitary intelligencc and
strengthening ofjornt military manoeuvres but excludes arms sales.
21 February: Belarus/Russia 
- 
signature in Minsk of a treaty of frrendship and cooperation by
Presrdents Lukashenka and Yeltsrn.
5 March Estonra 
- 
parliamentary elections and formatron of a centreJeft govemment under the
leadership of Tiit Vahi
6 March Belarus 
- 
President Lukashenka states that his country has no rntentton of joinrng NATO,
unlike other former Warsau' Pact members, and that he rejects present developments threatening to
brrng NATO closer to Belarus' borders.
12 March: Croatra 
- 
Presrdent Tudlman agrees to a six-month extension of the United Nations
Protection Force (IINPROFOR) mandate on Croatian terrrtory.
12 March: Hungary 
- 
the government rntroduces a further series of economrc reforms lcading to
increased imports, staff cuts rn the pubhc sector and lower welfare expenditure. Several mrnisters
belongrng to the sociahst majorrty resign in protest Further resignations follow in November
13-14 March: Albanra/Greece 
- 
visit to Albania b1' Greek Foreign Minister Karolos Papoulias rn an
attempt to smooth over relations between the tu'o countries.
13-22 March: Albania/Unrted States 
- loint militarl, exercises in Albania covering provisron of medrcal
ard rn the event of war or natural catastrophe.
15 March Slovenia/European Union 
- 
start of negotiatrons leadrng to the signature of a Europe
Agreement betrveen Slovenia and the EU.
17 March Ukraine 
- 
the Ukrainian Parliament annuls the constitution of the Ukrainian Republic of
Cnmea.
19 March: Hungan/Slovakra 
- 
srgnature rn Paris of a treaty, of friendship and cooperation by' Prime
Minrsters Gyula Horn and Vladimir Meciar.
20-21 March' OSCE 
- 
meeting in Paris of the foreign ministers of the 52 member countries of the
Organisation for Securitl' and Cooperatron in Europc (OSCE) for the close of the Conference on
Stabrlity in Europe which began in May 1994. The outcome was a "declaration on stabiliq'ln Europe"
The participants also gave an undertakrng to implement the one hundred or so bilateral and regtonal
treaties concluded during the conference.
I Apnl: [Ikraine 
- 
a decree issued by President Kuchma gives him direct control over the govemment
of the Ukrainian Republic of Crimea.
7 April: Ukraine 
- 
the Internatronal Monetary Fund (IMF) grants the country a loan package worth
nearly US$ 2 billion in support of the 1995 economic reform prograrnme.
I I Aprrl: Russia 
- 
the IMF grants a l2-month standby credit of approximately US$ 6.8 billion in
support of the 1995 economic reform and stabrhsation programme.
12 Aprrl: Estonia 
- 
the centreJeft government gains the confidence of the IMF which grants Estonia a
l5-month standbv credit of approximately US$ 22 mrllion rn support of the government's economic
reform prograrnme
13 April: FYROM/Turkel' 
- 
signature in Skople of a military agrecment to improve technical and
military-industrial cooperation between the two countries.
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17 Aprrl: Russta 
- 
Defence Minrster, Pavel Grachev Ernnounces that hrs country ll,ill rgnore the
provisions of the Conventronal Forces Europe Treaty (CFE) limiting Russian milrtary deployment rn the
Caucasus untrl the region returns to stabrlrtl', havrng warned on 3 April that Russia would withdraw
from the CFE Treaty if NATO expanded too qurckly.
21 April: Former Yugoslav Republic 
- 
UN Sccurrty Resolution 988 extends sanctrons agamst the FRY
for 75 days until 5 July. On 15 September the suspension is extended to March 1996
Early May: Croatia 
- 
Government troops retake western Slavonia from the rebel forces of the self-
proclaimed Repubhc of Serbian Krajina (RSK).
9 May: Parltament passes a law intended to speed up the privatisation process, delayed since the
maSority socialist coalition took power in July 1994.
14 May: Belarus 
- 
the Belarus population grants wrder powers to President Lukashenko in a
referendum
17, 19 and 22 May'. Bulgaria/Russia 
- 
signature of various economic cooperation agreements
incorporatrng a section on the defence industry'.
25 May" Ukraine/United States 
- 
visit to Lvov b1'Defence Secretary William Perry to attend the first
US-Ukrainian military exercises.
26May'. Belarus/Russia 
- 
conclusron of a customs agreement between the two countries.
26-27 May Central Europe 
- 
meetmg in Keszthely. Hungary, of the Heads of State and of Government
of Austria, the Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia to drscuss
European integration and the situatron m Bosnia and Herzegovina.
3l May: Russia/NATO 
- 
Russran Foreign Affairs Minister, Andrer Kozyrev srgns the section of the
PfP on the indivrdual partnership programme, covering jornt training and manoeuvres and mutual
consultation in various fields, from peacekeeping to nuclear security At a press conference the Mrnister
nevertheless reaffrrms Russia's opposition to NATO enlargement.
I June: Ukrarne/EU 
- 
entry mto force of the partnershrp agreement srgned rn June 1994.
3 June: Bosnia and Herzegovlna 
- 
meeting in Paris of 15 NATO members and other European states
contributrng troops to Bosnia on the creation of a rapid reaction force of l0 000 men, operating under
NATO mandate
6 June Croatia/Slovenia 
- 
progress rs achieved in resolving the border conflrct following talks between
Croatian Prime Minrster Nikrca Valentic and his Slovenian counterpart Janez Drnovsek
12 June: EU/Baltic states 
- 
srgnature of bilateral association agreements between the EU and Estorua,
Latvia and Lithuania.
15 June' EU/Slovenia - the EU and Slovenra agree on an association agreement, to be srgned after
settlement of Slovenia's difference with Italy over confiscation in the 1940s of property belonging to
Italians living in Slovenia.
19 June: Hungary 
- 
Arpad Goncz reelected by parliament as speaker for a five-year term.
20 June: Russia/Checiurya 
- 
after resolution of a hostage-taking led by Shamrl Basaev in Budennovsk
an agreement is signed on a ceasefire and negotiations on the wrthdrawal of Russian troops.
27 lune. EU/central Europe 
- 
meeting between EU member and associate states to prepare a white
paper on rntegration ofthe central and eastern European countnes.
I I July: Bosrua and Herzegovina 
- 
Srebrenica taken by Bosnian-Serb forces after withdrawal of United
Nations troops.
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17 Jull': Belarus/llkraine: signature of a treaty of friendship, good-neighbourly relations and
cooperation between the two countries. Ukrainian President Leorud Kuchma stresses however
negotiations on a possrble customs unron would be premature
23-24 July Bosnia and Herzegovina 
- 
deployment of the British and French rapid reactron force on
Mount Igan overlooking Sarajevo.
25 July: Bosnia and Herzegovina 
- 
taking of Zepa by Bosnian-Serb forces.
4-9 August: Croatia 
- 
in a lightning offensive, government troops overrun virtually the whole of the
Krajina.
7 August: Bulgaria 
-Zhan Videnov's socialist government approves the arrangements for the
distribution and use of vouchers in the first phase of the mass privatisation programme.
18 August: Visegrad Group 
- 
srgnature in Warsaw by the Czech Repubhc, Hungary, Poland, and
Slovakiaof anagreementprovidingfortheestablishmentofafree-tradeareabefore 1997. Slovenrais
present as an observer.
17 August. Albania 
- 
launch of the privatisation prograrnme by the rssue of vouchers to pnvate
rndrviduals.
30-3 I August: Bosnia and Herzegovina 
- 
NATO's Operatron "Dehberate Force" consisting of a senes
of airstrrkes on Bosruan-Serb targets throughout Bosnia.
30 August: Albania/FRY 
- 
President Berisha denounces the Belgrade authorities' policy to install
refugee Serbs from the Krajina in Kosovo.
7 September. Baltrc countries 
- 
joint communique in which the Estonian, Lafvian and Lithuanian
Presidents stress therr shared resolve to 1om NATO.
8 September. Bosnia and Herzegovina 
- 
meeting m Geneva between representatives of the Contact
Group (France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States) and the Bosnian, Croat
and Yugoslav Foreign Ministers (the last representing the Bosnian Serbs). Signature of an agreement
on the basic principles for a peace agreement.
I 1 September: CEFTA 
- 
meeting in Brno in the Czech Republic of the Prime Minrsters of the member
countries of the Central European Free Trade Agreement (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and
Slovakra). They decide to admit Slovenia as a member before the end of the year and to grant observer
status to Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lrthuania and Romania.
l l September: Bosnra and Herzegovina 
- 
launch of a vast Bosnian-Croat offensive in central and
western Bosnia.
12 September: Belarus 
- 
the IMF grants a standby credit of USS 293 mrlhon over 12 months in
support of the economlc reform programme.
13 September: FYROM/Greece 
- 
signature in Nevi' York of an interim accord between the foreign
ministers of the two countries, providing for mutual respect of each other's sovereignty, territorral
integrity and polrtrcal rndependence and recognrtion oftherrloint border as rnternational.
14 September: Bosnia and Herzegovina 
- 
NATO and the United Nations suspend Operatron
"Deliberate Force" for three days after Bosnian Serb leaders agree to withdraw their heavy weapons
from the 20-km exclusion zone around Sarajevo.
14 September: Ukraine/NATO 
- 
Foreign Minister Udovenko signs an indrvrdual cooperation
programme within the Partnership for Peace. On his return from Brussels, he reaffrrms lJkrarne's
resolve not to take sides and to maintain its non-aligned status. The cooperation agreement signed with
NATO contams no rndication that Ukraine intends to jorn NATO.
I October: Latvia: parliamentary elections lead to a highly-fragmented parliament with none of the
partres gainrng more than 67o of the vote.
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2 October: Romania 
- 
start of the second phase of mass privatisatron.
6 October: Ukrarne 
- 
Parliament approves prrvatrsations in the agncultural sector.
6-7 October CEI 
- 
Prtme Mmtsters and Forcrgn Ministers of the ten member countries of the Central
European Initratrve meeting m Warsarv decide to admit Albarua, Belarus, Bulgarra and Ukrame in earlv
t996
12 October: FYROM/OSCE 
- 
FYROM becomes a member of the OSCE
15 October: Greecc/FYROM 
- 
the Greek Government lifts the embargo rt imposed on FYROM in
Januarl' 1994 and also tts veto against the neu' state's accession to various intemational organisatrons
16 October. Albanra/Unrted States 
- 
srgnature of an agreement provrdrng for exchanges of mrlitary
informatron
29 October Croatta 
- 
the Croatran Democratrc Union (HDZ) again wms the parliamentarv elections.
Formation of a nerv government headed by Zlatko Matcsa.
3l October: Slovakra/Russia 
- 
stgnature of six cooperatron and economic assrstance agrecments.
2 November Ukraine 
- 
Parliament suspends the prrvatisatron process in certarn mdustries
9 November: Lrkraine and FYROM 
- 
both countries become members of the Councrl of Europe.
12 November. Croatia 
- 
signature of an agrccment betrvecn the Government and the breakarvay'Serbs
of castern Slavorua Thrs proposes remtegratron of the regron into the Croatian Republic under UN
administratron for a transrtronal penod of tr.vo years
l5 Novcmber: FYROM/NATO 
- 
FYROM becomes the2Tth state to srgn the PfP.
15 Novcmber Slovakra 
- 
Parhament passes a lau' confirming Slovak as the countn"s sole official
language and restnctrng the usage ofother languages rn public hfe.
16 November. Albania 
- 
follolving a vote in the People's Assemblr', the Government is called upon to
resolve privatisation drfficulties in the bankrng sector before March 1996.
l9 November: Poland 
- 
prestdcnttal electtons. Vrctorl'goes to Aleksander Ku'asnrervskr, leader of the
ruling Dcmocratic Lcft Alliance (SLD), over Lech Walesa
2l Novcmber Bosnta and Herzegovlna 
- 
conclusron of a peace agreement in Dalton betrveen Alrya
Izetbegovrc. Slobodan Mrlosevrc and Franjo Tudjman endorsmg partrron of the countn'.
22 November Poland 
- 
launch of the prrvatrsation programme agreed rn 1993 covering 600 statc
enterprises
22 November Former Yugoslavra 
- 
the UN Security Council hfts the sanctrons rmposed on former
Yugoslavia rn Ma1' 1992 Nd the arms embargo decrecd agarnst all former Yugoslav states tn
September 1991
December Hungary 
- 
launch of the pubhc services' privatisation prograrnme.
14 December: Bosnia and Herzegovlna 
- 
signature rn Paris of the peace agreement on Bosnia.
l4-17 December: Chechnva 
- 
Doku Zavgayev is elccted Presidcnt of the Chechen Republic rn elections
organrsed bv Moscow and boycotted by the separatists.
l7 December: Russia 
- 
electtons to the Duma. The Communist Party rvins rvith 22 3% of the vote.
20 December: Bosnta and Hcrzegovina 
- 
the United Nations Protection Force is replaced by NATO's
Implementatron Force (IFOR 
- 
60 000 troops).
Late December: Chechny'a 
- 
resumption of fightrng between Chechen separatists and Russian
Federation troops.
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1996
January: Lrthuania 
- 
the suspensron of operatrons of the country's most important commerctal bank,
the LAIB, in December, followed rn January b1' that of the Litrmpeks bank, leads to Lithuanra's most
serious domestic political crisis since rndependence.
4 Januarl,: Ukraine/Russia/United States 
- 
Kiev summit on the implementation of the nuclear
drsarmament treaty srgned rn January 1994
4 Januarl': Czech Repubhc/Slovakia 
- 
Czech Interior Minister Jan Ruml and hrs Slovak counterpart
Ludovit Hudek slgn a treaty in Prague defining thetr countries' common border.
5 January': Russia 
- 
resignatron of Foreign Minister Andrer Kozyrev who is replaced by Yevgeny
Pnmakov
l5 January: Croatia 
- 
the UN Security Council passes a resolution authonsrng the deployrnent of 5 000
blue berets to supervrse the demilitarisation of eastern Slavonia
19 January Bosrua 
- 
first results of the rmplementatron of the Dayton Accords: IFOR establishes a
four kilometre-u'ide separatlon zone between the Mushm-Croat Federatton and the Serb Entrtl'
2l January. Bosnia 
- 
resignation of Bosnian Pnme Minister Haris Silajdzic who is replaced by Hasan
Muratovic and appointment of a new goverrlment on 30 January.
24 lanuary: Poland 
- 
resrgnatron of Pnme Minrster Josef Oleksy, replaced on 3l January b1'
Wlodsrmrerz Cimoszeu icz.
6 February: Ukraine 
- 
President Kuchma asks for help from the West in closing down the Chernoby'l
power station
17-18 February: Bosnia 
- 
mini-summrt held in Rome under United States auspices on the follow-up to
the Dalton Accords.
20 February Bosnia 
- 
deplognent in Mostar of aloint Croat-Muslim pohce force.
22February Russia 
- 
Mr Camdessus, IMF Managing Director, announces that an agreement has been
reached rvrth Russia over a loan of USS 10.2 bilhon.
27 February. Bosnra 
- 
the NATO Security Council lifts sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs; IFOR
gives notrfication of rts effectrve rvithdrarval from the separation zones
28 February : Russra,/Council of Europe 
- 
Russia becomes member of the Council of Europe
18 March Bosma 
- 
mini-surrrmit held m Geneva under United States auspices to follor,r'up the Dayton
agreement.
2l March: Albania/Greece 
- 
srgnature rn Athens by the Albanian Foreign Minister Alfred Serreqi and
his Greek counterpart Theodoros Pangalos of a treaty of friendship, cooperation, good-nerghbourly
relations and security.
26 March: Russra 
- 
the IMF adopts a three-1'ear loan plan for Russia.
29 March. EU 
- 
opening of the intergovernmental conference.
29 March. CIS 
- 
the Presidents of four of the twelve members of the CIS - Belarus, Kazakhstan,
Kirghizstan and Russia 
- 
sign a treaty in Moscow instituting a "community, of integrated states".
30 March' Bulgana/Russia 
- 
Prcsident Zhelev turns down Russran proposals for a rapprochement
similar to that between Russra and Belarus and reaffrrms Bulgaria's ursh to be assimrlated into Western
European structures
3l March-l Aprrl South Balkans 
- 
meeting in Tirana of the Defencc Ministers of Albania, Bulgaria,
Italy, Macedonra, Turkey and the United States and a representative of the Swiss Presidency of the
OSCE
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2 Apnl: Russia/Belarus 
- 
slgnature by Prestdents Yeltsin and Lukashenko of a union treatv forming a
"Community of Soverergn Repubhcs".
8 April: FRY/FYROM 
- 
drplomattc relations are estabhshed betlveen the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
12 April Chechnya 
- 
the death is announced of the separatist leader Dzhokar Dudayev.
24 Aprrl. Croatia/Councrl of Europe 
- 
Croatia accedes.
29 April Russta 
- 
the Pans Club reschedules Russia's debt for US$ 40 billion granting it srx years
before repayrnent of the pnncipal and with the remairung commitments spread over a period of 25 years.
7 May: Bosnta 
- 
the first tnal of war crimes in Former Yugoslavia opens before the International War
Crimcs Trrbunal in The Hague.
7 Mav: WEU 
- 
meeting in Birmingham of foreign and defence mrnrsters of the 27 WEU member
countries
9 May: Bulgana 
- 
start of the financial cnsis caused by the fall in the rate of exchange of the lev. The
Government speeds up structural reform.
l0 May: Ukrame 
- 
the IMF approves a standby credit over 9 months of approximately
US$ 867 million
24 May Latvia 
- 
the IMF grants a standby' credrt of approximately US$ 43 million over 15 months to
support the Government's economlc programme.
27 May'. Russia/Checturya 
- 
Bons Yeltsin and the new leader of the Chechen separatists, Zelimkhan
Yandarbiyev, sign a ceasefire.
27 May Ukraine 
- 
Presrdent Kuchma dismisses Prrme Minister Marchuk and replaces him by Pavlo
Lazarenko.
28-29 Mat'. Baltrc States 
- 
summit meeting in Vrlnius betu,een Presidents Algirdas Brazauskas
(Lrthuania), Guntts Ulmanis (Latvra) and Lennart Merr (Estonia) Srgnature of a jornt declaration
stressing the need to pool therr efforts in their strategy for joining the EU and NATO. Signature of an
agreement on brtngmg down customs barriers on agricultural produce However no solution emerged to
respect of terrrtonal clarms.
31 May-1 June: Czech Republic 
- 
parliamentary elections Vaclav Klaus returned as Pnme Minrster
I June. Ukraine 
- 
President Kuchma announces that Ukrarne has completed rts nuclear disarmament
programme.
I June: Bulgaria 
- 
after the first primary held withrn the Union of Democratic Forces, Presrdent Zhelev
is replaced by Petar Stoyanov as the party's candidate rn the presidential electrons to be held rn January
1997.
2 June: Bosnia 
- 
mint-summrt held in Geneva under Uruted States auspices to monitor the Dayton
Accords.
4 June NATO 
- 
summrt meeting of NATO members in Berlin.
ll-22 June Baltic states 
- 
the "Amber Sea 96" 1ornt naval exercises involving Estonia, Latvia and
Lithuanra who are study'ing the feasibility of a common defence system, are held for the second year
runnmg.
26May and2,16 and 17 June' Albama 
- 
parliamentary electrons result rn a landshde victory forthe
ruhng Democratrc Partl'of Albania. The oppositron and OSCE observers pornt to irregularitres.
14 June. Russia/NATO 
- 
General Pavel Grachev, the Russran Defence Mrnrster, attends a meeting of
NATO defence mtnisters in Brussels where rt is decided to strengthen cooperation rvith Russia over
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arrnaments manufacture and control and fightrng organrsed cnme and terrorism. The NATO ministers
also accept rn prrnciple the instrtutronalisation of links between NATO and Russra. rncluding exchanges
of military staff. Negotrations open rvrth Russia to persuade it to agree to NATO enlargement to
rnclude former Warsaw Pact members.
16 June. Russra 
- 
first round of Presidentral elections. Borrs Yeltsin wins 35 28% of the vote
Gennady Zlnsganov 32.04% and Alexander Lebed 14 52%.
l7 June Russia 
- 
President Yeltsin appornts General Lebed National Security Advrser.
18 June Bosrua 
- 
the UN Secuntv Councrl and sanctions committee vote to end the embargo on arrns
shipments to formcr Yugoslav states. On 19 June "Operation Sharp Guard" is suspended.
18 Junc Latvia 
- 
the Saerma reelects Gunils Ulmanis Presrdent of the Republic He promises to
improve relatrons betrveen the various ethnrc groups living rn Latvra, to seek better relations u'tth Russta
and to rvork for the country"s accessron to the EU and NATO.
20 June Lrthuarua 
- 
the Sermas ratrfies the assocration agreement urth the EU signed in 1995.
25 June: Russia 
- 
Bons Yeltsrn slgns a decree providing for partral withdrarval of Russtan troops
deployed rn Chechnya by I September.
28 June. Poland 
- 
Parhament (Selm) adopts a lar,r allourng state enterprises to be prrvatised.
28 June. Ukrame 
- 
Parliament announces the adoption of a new constitution.
I Jull' Bosnia 
- 
signature in Florence of an arms control agreement under the auspices of the OSCE
betrveen Bosnian Serbs. Bosnian Croats, Muslims and the governments of Croatia and Serbia Under
the terms of this agreement the five partics have 16 months to reduce numbers of rveapons to a grven
limrt. Five types of lveapon are mvolved. tanks, heaq, artillery. armoured combat vehrcles. combat
aircraft and attack helicopters.
3 Jull': Baltrc Sea Council 
- 
adoptron m Kalmar, Sweden, of a cooperatton progralrlme on security,
economic development and the environment. to run to the 1,ear 2000. The documcnt also stresses the
importance of relatrons between the EU and Russia and the need for Estonia, Latvia, Lithuanra and
Poland to be fullv rntegrated rnto the EU.
3 July. Russia 
- 
Boris Ycltsrn rs elected Presrdent of the Russian Federation with 53 8% of the votes as
agarnst 40.3% for Gennady ZTuganov.
5 Juh': Lithuanra/Gernan), 
- 
signature of a financial cooperation treatl' under the terms of which the
German Investment and Development Fund becomes a sharcholder in the Lithuanian development bank
Thrs also forms the basis for grantrng long-term loans rvorth DM 20 million.
6 July Albanra 
- 
President Sali Berisha reappoints Alexander Mckst, of the Democratic Party of
Albania, as Pnme Mmrster follou'ing his party's victory in the parliamentarl'electtons held in May-June
u'hich rvere boycotted by the marn oppositron parttes.
I 2 July' Estonra,/Latvra 
- 
signature in Tahnn of an agreement on defining the maritime borders of the
t$'o countnes .
19 July Bosnia 
- 
resignation of Radovan Karadzic from the leadership of the Bosnian Serb Entrtl'and
as Charrman of the Serbian Democratic Party
29luly. Estorua 
-the IMF grants the country a crcdit for US$ 20 million over 13 months to assist the
government with rts 1996-97 economrc programme
6-14 August Russia/Chechnya 
- 
Alexander Lebed who is m favour of reaching agreement u'ith the
Chechen separatrsts is grven special powers by the Kremlin and takes charge of Chechen affatrs
21 August: Russia 
- 
the IMF approves the release of a US$ 330mrllion tranche of a total credit of
US$ 10.1 billion approved in March.
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23 August: Croatra/FRY 
- 
agreement normalising relatrons betrveen the trvo countnes by recstablishrng
drplomatrc and consular relations The ts'o partles undcrtake to define thcrr borders bl' mutual
agreement and to resolve an1' drsputes between them b1' peaceful means and to refrarn from the threat or
use of armed force
31 August Russra/Checturya 
- 
General Lebed and Aslan Maskhadov sign a peace agreement providrng
for the u'ithdrarval of Russian troops and a referendum on the status of Chechnva to be held m the vear
2001.
6 September. Romania,IFlungarJ' 
- 
signature of an agreement on securrtl' and confidence-burlding
measurcs providrng for exchange of militan' informatron as a confidence-burldrng mcasure betu'een the
trvo countries.
14 September Bosnia 
- 
(r) election of thc collectrve presidencl' of Bosnia and Herzegovina: Ah.ya
Izetbegovrc (Party'of Dcmocrattc Action, Mushm representative), Momcilo Krajisnik (Serb Democratrc
Par[', Serb representative). Kresrmrr Zubak (Croatian Democratrc Uruon of Bosnia and Herzegovma,
Croat representative). (u) electron of the members of the Assemblv of Unron of Bosnia and Herzegovina
(28-member Federatron Chamber of Deputres and l4-member Repubhka Srpska Chamber of Deputres
rvhcre the Partl' of Democratrc Actron rvon the largest number of seats): (ir) elecl.ron of the Federatron
House of Representatrvcs (Mushm-Croat Federatron) where the Party' of Democratrc Actron won a
maloritv of seats. (rv/ presrdential elections in the Repubhka Srpska rvrth victory going to Brljana
Plavstc of the Serb Democratic Partl'rvhrch also u-on a malontv rn thc People's Assembl1,
16 September Hungarl'/Romania 
- 
the Romanran Prime Mmrster Nicolac Vacaroru and hrs Hunganan
counterpart Glula Horn sign a treatv of understanding and good-nerghbourlv relatrons under thc terms
of u'hrch Hungarl' abandons anv terntonal clarm to Transvlvanra and Romania undertakes to guarantee
the rights of the large Hungarran minontv on rts sorl.
20 Septcmber: Estonra 
- 
Lennart Men rcelected President
25 September: Poland/Russia 
- 
signature of a trade agreement provrdrng for Poland to buy 250 bilhon
cubrc metres of Russian gas ovcr the next 25 vears
l7-i9 October Russta 
- 
Alexander Lebed is reheved of hrs functions as Secretarl' of the Security
Councrl and replaced b1'Ivan Rvbkrn, former Speaker of the Duma
October. Chechny'a 
- 
Aslan Maskhadov, mrlrtan' leader of the Chechen separatrsts is appornted Prime
Mrnister of the coalition government
3 November. Bulgaria 
- 
presidential elections u'on b1' Pctar Stovanov, the Union of Democratrc Forces
(UDF) candrdate
3 November Romarua 
- 
presrdentral and parliamentan' elections. Emrl Constantinescu becomes
Presrdent and hrs centre-rrght coalrtron, the Democratic Conventron of Romania wms a majoritv in
Parliament.
3 November. FRY 
- 
election of mcmbcrs of
Assemblv urth 138 seats) Vrctory goes to the
(sPS)
the Chambcr of Citizens (lou'er house of the Federal
Unrted List domrnated bv the Sociahst Partv of Serbra
5 November: Russra 
- 
Boris Yeltsrn undergoes a heart operation
8-9 November: CEI 
- 
summit rnGraz, Austria. Moldova admrtted as the l6th member of thc Central
European Inrtiative
l0 November. Lrthuania 
- 
parhamentary clcctions lead to vrctory by' the rrght rving parties. On 27
November the Seimas carries out the mvestiture of Prrme Minister Gediminas Vagnonus.
17 November: FRY 
- 
the munrcipal elections bring victory to the opposition coalrtion ''Together"
(Zaledno) in 13 of the l8 marn Serbian towns including Belgrade The Socrahst Partt, of Serbra
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dcclares the results null and vord in the rmmedrate aftermath of the elcctrons on grounds of
"irrcgularrtres" dunng the ballot.
2l November Bosma 
- 
start of Amencan arms supphcs u'orth a total of $ 400 milhon under the
''Equip and Tram" prograrnme for bnngrng Croatian and Bosnian forces together in a single unrt.
2l November. FRY 
- 
start of opposition demonstrations rn Belgrade in protest agarnst the annulment
of certain municipal election results
23 Novcmbcr. Russra/Chechnya 
- 
signature by' Prime Minrster Vrktor Chernoml,rdin and the hcad of
the Chechen separatrst movement Aslan Maskhadov of an agreement on normahsing relations betu'een
the two srdes. Thrs covers. rccstablishlng communrcatron lmks, transport of goods and rarl' matertals
and confidence-burlding measures in relatron to dcfence matters The agreement rvas critrcrscd in
Russra bv both Natronahsts and Communists.
24 November Belarus 
- 
referendum on the constitutron approving the rvrder po\\'ers granted to
Prcsrdent Lukachenka: extensron of the President's term of office from 1999 to 2001, apporntment by
the President of half of the members of the Constrtutional Court and thc Electoral Commission, of a
srgnrficant proportlon of the members of the nerv Parliamentan,Assembll', and local leaders
27 Novembcr FYROM 
- 
the UN Secuntv Council approves the extenston of UNPREDEP's (UN
Preventative Deplorment Force in Macedonia) mandate untrl 3l Ma1' 1997. Russra takes the vierv that
the extension approved rn Ma1' 1996 should havc been thc last and abstarns
Earlv December. Unrtcd States/SECI 
- 
Presrdent Clinton invites trvelve south cast European countrtes
to Geneva to launch thc South-East European Cooperatron Inittattve (SECI).
2-3 December: OSCE summrt rn Lrsbon.
l0-ll December. NATO 
- 
mcctrng in Brussels of the Foreign Ministers of the 16 NATO members
The mmrsters specifically state that the hst of central and eastern Europcan countries invited to 1om
NATO betu'een nou and 1999 urll be pubhshed at the Madrrd summit to be held in July 1997. The
final communique states that NATO countnes "have no intention, no plan and no reason to deplol'
nuclear \\'eapons on the territory of neu' members" Russra remains firml1' opposed to any NATO
enlargement tou'ards the east
I I Dccember: Russia 
- 
Defence Mrnrster Igor Rodionov reslgns hrs army commlsslon at Presrdent
Yeltsrn's request He thus becomes the first civrlian Defence Mmtster srncc 1925.
l2 December Bosrua and Herzegovlna 
- 
the UN Securitv Councrl unanimouslv authorises dcployrnent
of the stabilisatron force (SFOR) to replace IFOR whose mandate expires on 20 December (date of the
formal transfcr of porver bctrveen IFOR and SFOR).
12 December Bosrua and Herzegovlna 
- 
appointment by'the Bosnian Presrdencl'of the co-Chairs of
the Bosnian Council of Mmrsters Boro Bosic (Serb) and Hans Siladlzic (Mushm)
17 Decembcr : Bosnia 
- 
officral transfer of the po\\'ers of the Bosman Repubhc government to the
Federatron government. Bosnia and Herzegovina ccascs to exlst In parallel the self-proclarmed
Bosnian Croat para-state Herceg-Bosna ceases to exist. All of the above developments take place under
the terms of an agrccment srgned in Geneva betrvccn Franjo Tudlman and Ahla Izetbegovrc on 14
August 1996.
21 December. Bulgarra 
- 
Zhan Videnov resigns as Prime Mmrster and from the charrmanship of the
ruling Bulganan Socrahst Party'. His resrgnation follows thc defeat of his party"s candidate rn the
November Presrdentral electrons.
27 December FRY 
- 
the OSCE's report on the munrcipal elections supports the Serb opposition
coalrtron Zajedno's clarm to vrcton' rn Belgrade and in I 3 othor cities.
29 December: Chechnva 
- 
urthdrawal of the last of the Russian combat forces lcaving only logistical
and transport unlts on Chcchcn territory.
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1997
2l January': Czech Repubhc/Gerrnany 
- 
signature m Prague of a declaration of reconcrhatron. The
Czech Repubhc regrets the expulsron of the Sudetan Germans and Germanl' apologises for the
annexation of Sudetenland rn 1938 and atrocities committed under German occupation.
23 January. Albania 
- 
Parhament outlarvs pyramid finance schemes The follou'ing da1' there are
violent clashes betu'een 5 000 demonstrators and anti-riot police in Lushnla rn the south of the country.
28 January. Germany, France, Poland - srgnature rn Warsarv of an agreement to strengthen military
cooperation betrveen the three countries
14 Februarl': Bosnia 
- 
an international arbitration commissron on the fate of the drsputed town of
Brcko, clarmed by' Bosnian Serbs and Mushms, defers its final decisron to 15 March 1998 and makes
provision for the appomtment of a UN supervlsor.
28 Februan': FRY/Bosnia 
- 
srgnature m Belgrade of an agreement establishrng "special ties" between
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republika Srpska.
End February: Romarua 
- 
Prime Minister Victor Crorbea announccs a programme of economrc reform,
involving a drasttc reductron in the budget deficrt, hberalisation offorergn exchange and speeding up the
pnvatrsatron process, the stated oblective of u'hrch is to put the economv on a healthy footing so as to
obtam IMF loans
Early March: Bosnia 
- 
the Unrted States announce that American troops are to urthdraw at the end of
the SFOR's mandate rn mrd-1998.
2 March: Albania 
- 
President Sali Berrsha is reelected for a term of five years by Parliament and a
state of emergencv is proclarmed after rrots cause thirteen deaths rn the southern part of the country.
4 March. Russra/EU 
- 
summit in Moscow betu'een Presrdent Yeltsrn and EU leaders to strengthen
economrc partnership Although the cooperatlon agreement slgned rn Corfu in 1994 has not been
ratified by all membcr states an tnterim agreement rs allowrng trade arrangements to be rmplemented.
4 March United States/Bosnra 
- 
Defence Secretary Wrlham Perr1, states that American troops in
Bosnia urll rvrthdraw in mid-1998 and that rn the event of disturbances contrnurng Europeans will have
to provrde the necessary troops.
6 March: Bosnia 
- 
the OSCE defers municipal elections to September to ensure a "hrgh quality" ballot,
the results of which cal be rehed upon. The elections ll'hrch have been deferred repeatedly since
September 1996, are to take place on 12 and 13 Juh,.
7 March Russia./Councrl of Europe 
- 
the European Commissron, the Councrl of Europe and Russia
agree new projects for the current year and 1998 rvrthrn the frameu'ork of the lornt programme adopted
in 1996 (budget: 3.9 million ecus) to help Russra meet commitments and obligations contracted
(especrally in connectron rvrth constitutional and legal reform) when rt became a member of the Councrl
of Europe.
7 March Russia 
- 
Boris Yeltsrn appoints the head of the Presrdent's staff, Anatoli Chubais, as Deputv
Prime Mmister
9 March Albanra 
- 
President Berrsha and the opposition reach agreement on a gcneral amnesty, the
formatton of a government of national reconcrliation and the orgamsation of parliamentary elections
under OSCE superuslon before June. Hox'ever the rebels in control rn the south of the country'relect
the agreement.
l0 March: Romanta 
- 
President Constantrnescu states m a radio interview that the costs of modemlsmg
the countnes'armed forces are the onh' obstacle to hrs country's joining NATO as Romarua alreadl'
fulfils the criterra for democracl,and human rrghts compliance
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12 March: Bosnia 
- 
the civilian High Representative in Bosnia, Carl Brlt, announces that the UN
international pohce force m Brcko rs to be strengthened; also the appointment of the American drplomat,
Robert Farrand, as "supervisor" of the town authorities.
12 March: FYROM 
- 
the Skople authorities ask for the process of reducmg the number of UN blue
berets on rts terntory to be suspended on account of the escalatron of the Albanran crisis. The Secunty
Council dccided m November to reduce the UN force in Macedonia by 300 men b1, 30 April
13 March Albania 
- 
Presrdent Bensha, supported by the country's entire politrcal 6litc, requests
internatronal mrlrtary mterventron to reestabhsh constitutional rule and hold the country together.
13 March: Albania 
- 
the WEU Assemblv' Defence Committee, meetmg in Athens, unanimouslv adopts
a draft recommendatron requestrng the WEU Council to "ask the Plannrng Cell to (y' draw up a
contingency plan for possible operations in Albanra covering the full range of Petersberg operations ...
including control over the restitutron of arms and munitions" and (t) to mstruct the WEU Satellrte
Centre in Torrejon to provrde ongoing assessments of the srtuatron in Albanra for use by both the
Councrl and the Planning Cell On 13 March the WEU Assembly's Standrng Committee also
unanimoush' approves the recommendatron. The Assembly also notes that extending stabilrty and
security to the east rs pnmanlv a European responsibility and the greater the European role in NATO
the more acceptable the opening up of the latter rvill become to those who fear mcreased United States
dominance in the u'orld
13 March Slovakia 
- 
the European Investment Bank grants Slovenske Electrarne, the Slovakran
natronal electrrcrty, company a loan of 70 mrllion ecus, guaranteed by a consortrum of eleven European.
American and Japanese banks On the same da1', President Michal Kovac decrdes on 23 and 24 May
1997 as the dates for two referendums on Slovakia's accession to NATO and the election of the head of
state by universal suffrage.
14 March: Albama 
- 
the spokesman for the UN Security' Council states that the United Nations is
porverless to intervene in a civrl war
15 March: Germanl'/Albania 
- 
the German Government, forced to evacuate rts nationals from Trrana
as a matter of urgencv, calls rn a unrt of the Bundesrvehr stationed in Bosnia. This rs the first trme since
1945 that an action of this nature rs undertaken wrthout Parhament's explicit agreement.
17 March' Russia 
- 
President Yeltsrn appornts Borrs Nemtsov as First Deputl' Pnme Mmister
alongsrde Anatoli Chubais
18 March: Bulgaria/Albania 
- 
the Bulgarian Foreign Minrster announces that Bulgarra rs readv to
particrpate m irutratrves to restore order in Albania under the auspices of an international organisation.
l8 March: Italy/Albarua 
- 
the Itahan Foreign Miruster, Lamberto Dini, meets his Albanian counterpart,
Arjan Stavora, to coordrnate the Italian Government's humarutanan actlon l"rth that undertaken by
Trrana. The Italian authorities reiterate that their country is only temporarily open to refugees.
19 March: Italy/Albanra 
- 
to deal with the influx of Albanran refugees (almost ll 000 people crossed
the Straits of Otranto in one week) the Italian Government declares a state of emergency over the rvhole
of the terntory until the end of June. This exceptronal immrgration control measure provrdes for the
issue of a trvo-month vrsrtor's vrsa to refugees, extendible by'one further month, and repatriatron of an1'
persons regarded as dangerous.
20 March' Albania 
- 
as a proof that order has been reestabhshed in the capital the Albanian authontres
reopen Tirana arrport
20 March: Germany/Albania 
- 
the Bundestag formall)' approvcs the operation for evacuatmg natronals
carried out by'the Bundeswehr in Albanra on 15 March
20 March Romarua 
- 
the members of the G24 (u'hich brings together lhe 24 most advanced
industrialised countnes and coordinates financial assrstance from them to the central and eastern
European countries under the Presidency of the European Commission) undertake to provide
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approxlmatelv US$ 145 mrlhon m ard to Romania to enable rt turn round rts balance of palments The
EU had alreadl' decided to reschedule a loan to Romarua of 70 mrlhon ecus
20 March. Slovakra 
- 
Pnme Minister Vladrmrr Mecrar. usltmg Pans. receives support from France for
his country's mtegration into the European rnstitutrons
20 March FRY 
-the Yugoslav Parhament ratrfies the treatl' establishrng "spccial relations" betu'cen
Belgrade and the Bosnran Serbs The mam oblective of the treatf is to crcate a single market
20 March. [IkrarneAiATO 
- 
addressrng the Ambassadors of the 16 Atlantrc Allrance countrics,
Ukrarnian Forergn Mmlster Udovenko states that his countn"s strategic oblective rs to be fully
rntegrated u'rth European and Euro-Atlantic securitv structures. including NATO.
2l March Itall/Albanra 
- 
the Itahan Defence Minrster rejects the rdea of armed intervcntion by Italy
and Albanra
20-21 March Russra/Unrted States 
- 
summit meeting held betrveen Presrdents Yeltsin and Clinton rn
Helsrnki. Thc follou,rng da1' Presrdent Yeltsm states that Russra's mtentron rs to achreve recognrtion at
last as a full1-fledged Europcan state and that it is also rcadl' to loin the European Uruon.
26 March. Bosnia/NATO 
- 
Presrdent Izetbegovrc asks President Clinton to allow his countn to jorn
the Partnershrp for Peace on the grounds that rt mrght open the u-ay to a more lasting peace wrthrn the
region
26 March Albania 
- 
the European Commisslon approves an rnrtral allocatron of humanitarian ard
u'orth 2 mrllion ccus for victrms of the Albanran crisis bcrng carcd for b1' the Internatronal Red Cross
(medical asslstance and emergcncl'food ard)
28 March Albania 
- 
the UN Securrtv Council approves the deployment of a force responsrble for
protecting humarutarian rntervention rn Albanra The forcc, under Itahan command, rs being deployed
in accordancc xrth Chapter VII of the Unrted Nations Chartcr for a threc-month period
28 March Itall/Albanra 
- 
an Albanran patrol boat carn'ing a hundred or so refugccs founders off
Brrndrsr after colhdrng r,r,ith an Italian navv vessel The drsaster toll rrses to over 80 victims.
31 March FRY/Repubhka Srpska 
- 
conclusron of a customs agreement betu'cen the Bosnran Serb
authontres in Pale and Belgrade
2 Aprrl BelarusiRussla 
- 
srgnature in Moscorv of a draft treatl' of unron betlveen Belarus and Russia.
I I Apnl Albanra 
- 
European mrlrtan' deplol'ment bcgrns in thc country urth the drsembarkatron at
Durres of an rnrtial Itahan contingent, to be follou'cd b1' unrts from France. Greece, Romarua and Spain
l2-13 Aprrl. Bosrua 
- 
Pope John-Paul II vrsrts Saralevo.
13-14 April: Croatia 
- 
the ruhng Croatran Democratrc Unron (HDZ) rvins a decisive vrcton' rn the
Zagreb municrpal electrons urth a ma.lority' in 19 of the 2l regronal councrls.
14 April Russia 
- 
the Chairman of the World Bank announces that Russia rs to be granted a US$ 6
billion loan over tu'o 1'ears - two thirds of it to contrrbute to Russra's budget and the rest for
investment He also confirmed the World Bank's rntention of negotratmg a second loan for modermsrng
the Russran coal rndustn'.
14-15 Aprrl ERDB 
- 
at the ERDB's annual general meetrng, representatives of the ccntral European
countries. rn partrcular thc Czech Republic and Poland, request thc bank not to pull out rn order to help
them better prepare therr accession to the European Uruon
15 April. Bosnia 
- 
the members of Bosnra's collegiate presidencl'reach agreement on a currency and on
the establishment of a smgle central bank
15 Aprrl: EU/Slovenra 
- 
thc Slovcnian Prime Minister. Janez Drnovsek. announccs he is to submit the
Europc agreement srgned rvrth the European Unron last June to parhament for ratification.
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l7 Apnl: Albania 
- 
thc marn Albanian polrtical parties 
- 
Presrdent Sali Bensha's Democratic Alliancc
and Pnme Mrnrster Bashkrim Fino's Socrahst Party 
- 
agree to hold earll' (parhamcntan') clcctrons on
29 June
17 Aprrl. Romania 
- 
Parliament adopts thc 1997 budget, rvhrch envrsages a budget deficit of 4.5%, of
GDP.
17 April: Russia.rNATO 
- 
President Yeltsrn announces that a NATO/Russra summit vvrll be held rn
Paris, on 27 May, durrng the coursc of rvhich a stratcgic coopcration agreement rs due to be srgned
l9 April. Bulgaria 
- 
Parhamentary eleclons result in vrcton' for the centre-right coalition, the United
Dcmocratrc Forccs, u'ith 52 03o/, of the l'ote. Thc Bulganan Socralist Partl' secures a mere 22.04o/o of
the vote. The turn-out. at 58.31o%, rs the lou'est srnce 1989.
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